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Abstract
Civil rights commemorative boulevards are an increasingly important method of
framing African American community revitalization and persistent historical
inequities. Often underlying planning efforts to revitalize segregated African
American neighborhoods, these boulevards are one important change
mechanism for realizing equitable development and challenging structural
racism.
This thesis demonstrates the central importance of these
commemorative boulevards in framing redevelopment and maintaining
community resolve during the long struggle for revitalization.

New Orleans Civil Rights Movement; civil rights commemoration;
revitalization; urban planning; structural racism; urban history; Martin
Luther King, Jr. Boulevards; community-based planning; redlining; racial
zoning; public housing; African American commercial districts.

vi

If we really are about the business that [Dr. King] was about and have the agenda
that he had, then we would do things to improve the life of the people who he was
concerned with. And that‟s what I‟d like to see happen on these streets named in
his honor. They should be change mechanisms1

1
Introduction
The story of revitalization in Central City, New Orleans began over 40 years ago with civil
rights commemorative boulevards as a central strategy to overcome a history of racial segregation
and economic discrimination. In order to understand the commemorated boulevards of today we
must carefully analyze the “creation” of Central City—one of New Orleans‟ hypersegregated African
American communities2—within an historical perspective. Continued planning efforts in Central
City, and the urban planning discipline, will benefit from a broader analysis on how structural racism
impacts the revitalization of the community.
Structural racism—whereby the interactions between institutions over time create durable
inequalities3—inhibits the individual and community aspirations of minorities. African American
communities, in particular, are linked by a shared history of slavery, unrelenting racism and perpetual
struggles for equality. For generations, African Americans engaged in campaigns to ensure civil and
human rights, enduring immense adversity in efforts to undo segregation. Even with triumphant
legal and legislative victories, the Civil Rights Movement failed to dismantle the insidious structural
forces preventing the full integration of African Americans into American society. These structures
were embedded in tools for urban development since the turn of the 20th century.
White segregationists combined housing, commercial, and job market discrimination in a
potent racist cocktail to keep African Americans in “poverty or deliberately impoverished” after the
fall of slavery.4 Beginning in the early 20th century, land use, zoning, lending, and real estate practices
embedded racist valuations into neighborhood development and formed enduring patterns for
segregating residential and commercial economies.5 Under Jim Crow conditions, African American
1

African American Resident of Miami, FL, as quoted in the film, MLK Boulevard: The Concrete Dream, Two-Tone
Productions, Directed by Marco Williams, 2003.
2
Denton, 2006
3
Grant-Thomas and Powell, 2006; Grant-Thomas and Powell, 2008
4
Fredrickson, 2002, p. 101
5
Freund, 2007; Massey and Denton, 1993; Immergluck, 2004
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entrepreneurs struggled to finance businesses and create viable commercial corridors. In housing
markets, the combined effects of redlining, zoning, and land use planning prevented African
Americans from entering one of the largest economies and strongest means to develop household
wealth.6 And when looking for employment opportunities in a rapidly expanding industrial
economy, African Americans were systematically denied higher paying private sector jobs. The
interactions between these institutional practices created African American communities that are not
“treated as part of regional economies and, instead, are treated as separate, independent
economies—that is, ghettoized—[which] can largely be attributed to racism.”7 The cumulative
effects of excluding African Americans in the broader housing and job markets play a significant
role in persistent poverty by concentrating jobless and unskilled people who are hemmed in by strict
color lines. The result of these structures at the neighborhood level can diminish the ability of
African American communities to stabilize and revitalize long after legalized segregation. After the
fall of Jim Crow, African American leaders searched tirelessly for ways to overcome persistent
economic inequality, leading to shared experiences and some common strategies to challenge the
structural impediments in American society.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 8 galvanized the Civil Rights Movement and became the symbol
of the struggle for civil and human rights for millions of African Americans. After Dr. King‟s tragic
assassination in 1968, and in recognition of national and local struggles for justice, communities
across the country renamed streets to commemorate his legacy. Over time, this was accompanied
by the commemoration of other national and local leaders of the Civil Rights Movement.9 There are
now approximately 900 streets (from now on referred to as MLKs) named after Dr. King, the
majority of which are located in the South.10 Regardless of whether MLKs are prominent
boulevards, commercial corridors, or country roads, they are often referred to as the “Black Main
Street,” connoting a shared history and experience in American society.11
Although the renaming of streets is of increasing importance to African Americans publicly
honoring their history and struggles during the Civil Rights Movement, commemorations are
marked by decades of racial and political tensions that limit where and how the past is memorialized.
Civil rights commemorative boulevards are often restricted to segregated African American
6

Freund, 2007; Oliver and Shapiro, 2006
Ross and Leigh, 2000, 371
8
When referring to Martin Luther King, Jr., himself, this study will use Dr. King.
9
Dwyer, 2000; Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a
10
Alderman, 2011; Michelson et al., 2007
11
Tilove, 2003; In Central City, the term “African American Street” is also used.
7
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communities, acquiring stigmas that affect investment decisions in the neighborhood. In many
cases, the fight to rename streets further divides an already racially segregated community.12
Despite the limitations placed on MLKs, community leaders around the country are actively
looking at ways to revitalize commemorative boulevards. By renaming streets, African American
leaders challenge political, residential, and economic structures as a means to claim public space for
their own history and redevelopment. Directly linking the commemoration of civil rights struggles
with battles against inequities in jobs, housing, and business development for African Americans,
many neighborhoods are looking to revitalize “African American Streets” and incorporate them into
the larger economy.13 If navigated strategically, commemorative boulevards can be a powerful and
positive tool that can attract investment and planning attention for the neighborhood.
There is a distinctive rise in the commemoration of civil rights leaders as a tool for economic
development and heritage tourism. As a new “growth industry,” heritage tourism offers a potential
avenue for local economic development and a means to share the community‟s historical culture.14
As a means of developing the heritage “infrastructure,” commemorative boulevards have the
potential to invite reinvestment. Using tools like anchor institutions, mixed-income housing
redevelopment, and culture-based art and performance centers, community leaders continue to plan
for Central City‟s “turning point” towards revitalization. Nonetheless, these initiatives suffer from
persistent structural racism, fragmented planning efforts, and potentially inequitable distribution of
benefits to the community. By placing Central City‟s plans for revitalization within a historical
context of structural racism, this study analyzes civil rights commemoration as a vehicle for
dismantling segregation in an African American community.
It is the intention of some African American leaders to rename streets in honor of the Civil
Rights Movement to keep the conversation about justice alive.15 At times, this commemoration can
seem to work against the neighborhood as it evokes the vitriol of some white communities, which
can reinforce the structural barriers in private lending institutions. Moreover, commemorative
boulevards also draw out open conflicts over memory and history within the local African American
leadership and raise questions about what is most important for the community. The true challenge

12

Mitchelson et al., 2007; Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a
Schleifstein, Mark, “Many hope the first financial institution in a generation to set up shop on Oretha Castle Haley
Boulevard is a sign of the area‟s rebirth,” The Times-Picayune, December 11, 2004; Ross and Leigh, 2000
14
Inwood, 2010; Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a
15
Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a
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of these commemorative campaigns for revitalization is whether they can deliver on the long list of
generational demands for justice.
Commemoration may also raise more questions than it answers. Should the streets look a
certain way, be in a particular place, and transcend race and class divisions? What does revitalization
really mean when used in conjunction with civil rights commemoration? Does commemoration of
African American history encourage reinvestment or further racism and segregation of residential
and commercial economies? Street renaming after civil rights leaders provides a high-mark for
community organizations to live up to, bringing enduring optimism and also persistent frustration
with planning for revitalization. It is with a clear understanding of the structures inhibiting
revitalization that commemorative campaigns can achieve even greater impacts. This thesis offers a
compelling reason to include a historical analysis of structural racism in relation to commemoration
and how to move revitalization and planning efforts towards greater equity for African American
inner city communities.
Civil rights street commemoration is one of many vital ingredients in the concerted effort to
revitalize Central City. Alone, commemoration adds to the rich tapestry of memory written in our
urban landscape, but it does little to overcome residential segregation or the structures of the
economy. However, when commemoration is used in conjunction with revitalization, it can serve as
a “change mechanism” to integrate history and living culture with strategies for reinvestment and
equitable development. Honoring the civil rights leaders that fought against segregation and
structural racism is a valuable asset in the revitalization of a community, one that provides a versatile
foundation for framing redevelopment decisions during the ongoing struggle for justice in African
American communities.
Overview of Chapters
This thesis orients the history of Central City around the major historical and federal policy
trends that affected the development and perpetuation of structural racism. The second chapter
begins with a brief history of Central City, New Orleans and the limitations on African American
enterprise under Jim Crow. It analyzes the development of tools for segregation—primarily racial
zoning ordinances, racially restrictive covenants, redlining, and public housing—that developed
long-term structures in housing finance, economic development, public policy, and land use
planning.

4

The third chapter focuses on Central City during the Civil Rights Movement and the federal
programs that developed as a response the national urban crisis of the 1960s. Central City civil
rights leaders challenged the structures of segregation, while at the same time using the War on
Poverty and Model Cities programs to begin organizing for a revitalized neighborhood. Out of the
turbulent time period, Central City developed African American political and community leaders
who led the struggle to commemorate streets in honor of civil rights leaders during the 1970s-80s.
The fourth chapter focuses on the evolving strategies to revitalize Central City. Arising
from the long-term efforts of organizations located in the neighborhood, campaigns for
revitalization are directly influenced by Central City‟s civil rights history and the relevance of living
culture. By placing the decades of revitalization strategies in Central City within the context of
structural racism, this chapter investigates how revitalization efforts struggle to overcome historical
inequities and integrate African American communities into the larger economy. Additionally, this
chapter and the conclusion (chapter 5) offer insights on how Central City and the planning discipline
could benefit by using a broad historical analysis of civil rights commemoration, structural racism,
and revitalization in segregated communities.
Although this study paints a broad perspective on the links between civil rights
commemoration, revitalization, and structural racism in Central City, there are limitations of the
analysis. The perspectives of the people that live and work in Central City, especially the residents
themselves, could not be fully represented in this thesis. It is the hope of the author that future
research will try to expand the scope of this work to understand the relationship between resident
and community-based organizational perspectives on civil rights commemoration in Central City.
Although this study uses considerable archival research materials, secondary literature was invaluable
to assist with the research for this thesis. By tying together archival research, secondary literature,
and interviews with Central City leaders, this study adds to the literature on urban planning, MLK
Streets, structural racism, and civil rights history of Central City, New Orleans.

5
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Laying the Structural Foundation for Central City
New Orleans‟ history as an integrated city changed profoundly over the course of the 20th
century. Between 1900 and 1940, a profusion of new concepts and tools in land use planning,
zoning, and the real estate profession affected neighborhood development and racial segregation in
cities throughout the United States. These early mechanisms for segregating neighborhoods
undergirded housing finance, federal policy, and public perceptions by the 1930s. Central City, New
Orleans experienced all of the national trends for segregating African Americans during this
formative period of metropolitan development.
Persistent racial disparities arose from these institutionalized structures in real estate, housing
policy, and land use planning. By using a structural racism perspective, this chapter “emphasizes the
powerful impact of inter-institutional dynamics, institutional resource inequities, and historical
legacies on racial inequalities today.”16 The cumulative effects of excluding African Americans from
housing and job markets played a significant role in concentrating jobless and unskilled people in
segregated communities hemmed in by strict color lines.

By intent, segregation limited “the access

that [African Americans] have to resources and economic opportunities…[so] that most of those in
the stigmatized category are either kept in poverty or deliberately impoverished.”17 It is precisely
because of the powerful structural interactions between housing and job discrimination that
segregation and poverty are maintained over generations. The effects of these structures in Central
City diminished the ability for African Americans to stabilize and revitalize their community long
after de jure segregation.
This chapter begins with a brief history of the neighborhood that became known as Central
City. It positions Central City directly within the national structures that solidified residential and
economic segregation. These areas will be developed separately, but throughout this thesis I will
show how housing and economic discrimination work in structural unison—aided by individual and
institutional acts of discrimination—to restrict African Americans‟ access to political power, job
opportunities, and capital.18
16

Grant-Thomas and Powell, 2008, p. 119
Fredrickson, 2002, p. 101
18
Grant-Thomas and Powell, 2008
17
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Uptown, the Backswamps, and the Tragic Irony of the Integrated Dryades Street Neighborhood
Long before Central City was known as such, the area upriver from the French Quarter and
the Central Business District was part of the growing Uptown. The Mississippi River to the south
and dense cypress swamps to the north confined the Uptown neighborhoods to a sliver of high
ground. The French engineer and architect Barthelemy Lafon commissioned the original plan for
this neighborhood in 1806, incorporating grand boulevards, residential squares, markets, and even
drainage canals.19 Lafon named the streets parallel to the boulevards after the nine Greek Muses,
including Melpomene—the muse of singing and tragedy (a portion of which later became Martin
Luther King Jr. Boulevard). Lafon also named one street Dryades, refering to tree nymphs in a
whimsical reminder of the bordering cypress swamp (a portion of which later became Oretha Castle
Haley Boulevard).20
Racial disparities in housing began with the earliest designs for the neighborhood. Wealthy
whites owned elegant properties along the regal boulevards. African Americans—most of whom
were slaves at the time—were relegated towards the least desirable land bordering the swamps.21
This area was known as the “backswamps” and condemned its inhabitants to the cheapest housing
options available. By design, “blacks were pushed into the demi-land on the inland margin of the
natural levee, where drainage was bad, foundation material precarious, streets atrociously
unmaintained, mosquitoes endemic, and flooding a recurrent hazard.”22 Without a boulevard on the
back end, the swamps hemmed in Central City and prevented development until mechanized
pumping started in the early 20th century.
The development of canals and the concomitant immigrant influx from the 1830s onward
dramatically changed the nature of Uptown New Orleans. Waves of immigrants from Ireland,
Germany, and other European countries flooded into the area, with the final major influx of Eastern
European Jews, who made up a significant portion of the population well into the 20th century. The
synchronous introduction of immigrant labor with the construction of the Melpomene and New
Basin Canals in the 1830s brought new tenement structures built by speculators in rapid succession
19

Hastings, 2004
For more information on the naming history see Hastings (2004) and Chase (2001)
21
Lewis, 2003; Spain, 1979; See Campanella (2006) for maps on the distribution of free people of color and slaves in
New Orleans. Higher concentrations of slaves were present in the Uptown area, as opposed to the three -tiered racial
castes of the Downtown neighborhoods, characterized by a racial hierarchy of Whites, Creole free people of color, and
slaves (Hirsch, 1992).
22
Lewis, 2003, p. 52
20
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to house the growing working class, both African American and white. Likewise, after the Civil
War, an influx of rural African Americans freed from the bonds of slavery migrated into the
neighborhood and it became known as an area for Protestant, rather than Catholic, African
Americans.23 During this time, the area around Dryades Street became more integrated, less wealthy
and more of a reflection of the city‟s ethnic and racial diversity. Even with the constant influx of
immigrants, the neighborhood remained relatively stable, although the majority of the property
owners in the area were either wealthy Americans or ethnic whites.24
Although racial tensions flared at times, there is evidence to show that the integrated
neighborhoods around Dryades Street were fairly stable until the end of the 19th century. A riot in
1900 in the neighborhood sparked white mob violence against African Americans in the area, but
apparently did not lead to more rioting or any short-term effects on residential segregation.25
Despite the relative calm of racial tensions, African Americans—now freed from slavery—continued
to suffer from the effects of living in the backswamps, consistent housing shortages, constraints on
jobs, and limited access to homeownership as compared to the ethnic whites. As a result, the
Dryades Street neighborhood began to concentrate more unskilled workers and the housing density
dramatically increased. By one account, the housing density in the Dryades Street Neighborhood
nearly doubled between 1900-1920.26
In addition to relatively stable residential neighborhoods, Central City also contained one of
the most successful commercial corridors in the city—Dryades Street. Bartholemy Lafon‟s plan for
the Dryades area planted the seed for this corridor‟s early success. Lafon designed the Dryades
Street Market at the corner of Dryades and Melpomene, which after opening in 1849 offered fresh
produce and meats well into the twentieth century.27 The Dryades Street commercial district
surrounded the market, offering a thriving hub of commerce for the integrated neighborhood that it
served. Dryades Street offered opportunities for immigrants to build wealth and establish a niche in
the larger New Orleans culinary and retail economy.28 At the turn of the twentieth century, Dryades
Street also hosted some successful African American businesses, including three insurance firms and

23

Rogers, 1993
Hastings, 2004
25
Ibid; The riot is known as the Robert Charles Riot of 1900, and it involved a shoot out between an African American
man, Robert Charles, and police officers. In retaliation, white mobs attacked African American residents in Central City.
26
Ibid, p. 63
27
Medley, 2001
28
Hastings, 2004
24
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a newspaper, along with a stretch of service industries.29 Due to the segregated shopping along
Canal Street, the city‟s main commercial corridor, Dryades Street businesses greatly benefited from
serving the African American clientele with limited options for retail and personal services.30
Although Dryades supported an integrated shopping district, the survival of African
American businesses depended on access to capital, which was significantly limited under Jim
Crow.31 Although there were several African American-owned businesses along Dryades, the
majority of businesses were owned by ethnic whites, primarily Jews. Central City‟s integrated
commercial and residential patterns resulted in a less dense African American commercial district
than in other southern cities at the time, which diffused economic power and prevented wealth
accumulation within the African American business community. In addition, there is no evidence of
African American banks along Dryades or anywhere else in New Orleans area at the time.32 Thus,
Central City did not enjoy “employment and circulated capital in the black community, thereby
creating economic growth” as in other southern cities like Atlanta, Richmond, and Memphis.33
Within a few decades after the turn of the 20th century, most of the thriving African
American businesses apparently disappeared. One Jewish merchant who was on Dryades since the
1940s recalled that he “didn‟t know of any black shopkeepers.”34 This situation is not unique to
Central City because “the history of black business development in the United States is inextricably
linked to the history of social and economic development of blacks more generally in this country.
Occupational, legal, and de facto segregation as well as slavery severely limited income and wealth
generation for blacks.”35 Therefore, for generations, the structures of business development limited
the development of African American commercial activity and caused many to shutter, as they
struggled in an environment of constant discrimination.36
As African American businesses closed along Dryades, the opportunities for decent jobs
diminished. Dryades Street supported a vibrant integrated mix of businesses owned by whites that
catered to the African American population, but did not hire them above menial jobs. The
29

Ingham, 2003; Medley, 2001
Medley, 2001
31
Immergluck, 2004
32
LaViolette, 1960.
33 Ingham, 2003, p. 664
34 Hannusch, Jeff, “Dryades Street Merchant,” Times Picayune Dixie, December 13, 1981.
35 Immergluck, 2004, p. 53
36 See Immergluck (2004) for a thorough analysis of the history of banking, lending, and African American business in
America. Also see Butler (2005) and Oliver and Shapiro (2006) for a history of African American entrepreneurship and
the limits on African American wealth accumulation under Slavery, Jim Crow, and persistent racial inequalities in
business.
30
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combined effect of job discrimination and limited capital for African American businesses had
dramatic affects on Central City as Dryades Street and the surrounding neighborhood became more
segregated. The widespread job discrimination aided in the development of New Orleans‟ ghetto,
especially with increased unemployment for African Americans in the 1950s. However, it was this
job discrimination, as I will show in the next chapter, that also led to some of the most ambitious
and successful protests and boycotts in New Orleans during the Civil Rights Movement.

The Long-Term Structural Effects of a Thwarted Racial Zoning Ordinance
Zoning arose at the turn of the 20th century as a way to protect and enhance property values
by literally segregating incompatible land uses, thereby keeping unsafe or unpopular uses away from
residences or commercial properties. The early progressive values of the planning tool changed
when zoning advocates, realtors, and suburban developers shared the belief that the presence of
African Americans—rich or poor—could affect property values. In 1910, Baltimore passed the
nation‟s first racial zoning ordinance, which attempted to segregate whites and blacks just as it would
keep rental housing and single-family homes separate.37 The practice quickly spread through
American cities—even in the North and West—but much of the zeal for racial zoning took place in
the South, where “early zoning advocates believed in racial hierarchy, openly embraced racial
exclusion, and saw zoning as a way to achieve it.”38 In a rapidly expanding New Orleans during the
1920s, segregationists identified racial zoning as another Jim Crow strategy for the subjugation of
African Americans.39
Racial attitudes towards residential segregation changed rapidly in the 1920s.40 At a time
when new mechanical pumps allowed for the draining of swamps to build middle-class
neighborhoods, whites exerted more racial intolerance over the potential for integration in newly
developing areas of the city.41 An ally of the realtors and developers that espoused newly forming
racial housing economics, the white supremacist media in New Orleans fueled racial tensions by
reporting on the “invasions” of African Americans into white neighborhoods in northern cities like
Chicago, which reportedly led to violence and lowered property values.42 Much of this rhetoric
developed in the 1910s-1920s, as zoning advocates and the real estate profession created the market
Silver, 1996
Freund, 2007, p. 46
39 Silver, 1996, p. 32
40 Hastings, 2004; Thomas and Ritzdorf, 1996
41 Hastings, 2004
42 Times Picayune, “Race Segregation Ruling”, March 15, 1927, page 10.
37
38
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conditions and the rationale for segregating neighborhoods.43 In New Orleans, this pressure did not
single-handedly segregate the historically integrated neighborhoods, but it laid the structural
foundation for de facto segregation that impacted New Orleans long after de jure segregation was
defeated.
The U.S. Supreme Court‟s decision to ban racial zoning did not stop New Orleans‟ officials
and residents from enacting an ordinance of their own. In 1917, the Supreme Court prohibited
racial zoning ordinances in Buchanan v. Warley, finding that these types of ordinances denied the “full
use of property” merely from a “feeling of race hostility.”44 Unsurprisingly, segregationists in the
South ignored the ruling and continued to press for racial zoning ordinances, reasoning that it was
within the purview of Jim Crow to segregate neighborhoods just like public accommodations.45 The
New Orleans City Planning Commission, first in the South, was created in 1923 in part to pass a
racial zoning ordinance and “evade the ruling of the Supreme Court.”46 The Louisiana Legislature,
aware of the power of zoning to segregate races and armed with strong segregationists from
northern rural parishes, passed a law in 1924 that mandated all cities over 25,000 people to segregate
neighborhoods by race.47 New Orleans complied in “exactly one week” by passing a racial zoning
ordinance and recruiting a well-known urban planner by the name of Harland Bartholomew.48
The effects of the racial zoning ordinance would have had sweeping effects on the integrated
neighborhoods in New Orleans. Landlords would not be able to rent to people of another color
unless residents of the neighborhood signed petitions in support of it—an unlikely feat in light of
growing racial animosity. Homeowners would not be able to renovate or make additions to their
property if they were out of compliance with the zoning code. As seen in Birmingham, which was
the only city with a racial zoning law on the books until 1951, the zoning ordinance could have a
“significant impact” on segregating neighborhoods.49

Freund, 2007
As quoted in Silver, 1996, p. 31
45 Silver, 1996; Connerly, 2005
46 Silver, 1996, p. 34
47 Act 118, Senate Bill No. 119, introduced by Mr. McConnell, Papers of the NAACP (microfilm collection), Part 5: The
Campaign against Residential Segregation 1914-1955, Reel 2, Frame 625; Hirsch, 1992
48 Hirsch, 1992, p. 268; Also see Connerly (2005) and Silver (1996). The advocates for the New Orleans Planning
Commission were by no means unanimous in their decision to pursue a racial zoning ordinance. According to Hastings
(2004), immediate dissent from the NAACP and African American leaders was also joined by some white progressives,
such as Charles Favrot, an outspoken defender of comprehensive zoning and planning and part of a Chamber of
Commerce interracial relations committee.
49 Connerly, 2005, p. 49
43
44
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Reactions from the African American community swiftly brought the racial zoning
ordinance to court. Although the Downtown Creoles and Uptown Protestants rarely worked
together on previous civil rights campaigns, the racial zoning sparked a newly shared sense of racial
solidarity. The NAACP raised several thousand dollars to wage the legal battle that ultimately
resulted in the successful overturning of the racial zoning ordinance.50 The defendant in the case
was Benjamin Harmon, an African American man who was trying to convert his single cottage to a
double51—a common building type in New Orleans that, if curtailed, could have limited the ability
for African Americans to expand upon their properties and create an additional income source.
The City of New Orleans defended its case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. As in
other Southern cities, New Orleans‟ white elite advocated zoning and comprehensive planning as
another “Jim Crow strateg[y]…to transform the racially integrated Southern city into [a] bifurcated
racial world.”52 The Times-Picayune argued along with the city in support of the ordinance,
claiming that race “invasions have wrought disaster to property values, while aggravating racial
bitterness and provoking violent breaches of the public peace” and that the recently upheld Euclid v.
Ambler decision legitimized zoning for segregating races.53 New Orleans lawyers also argued that the
ordinance was legal under the separate but equal logic of Plessy v. Ferguson, as the ordinance‟s design
prevented integration in both African American and white neighborhoods. On March 14, 1927, the
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance without any consideration of Plessy in their opinion. The
Court‟s opinion merely stated: “Reversed on the authority of Buchanan v. Warley.”54 Thus ended the
legal use of racial zoning in New Orleans.
Although the racial zoning ordinance lasted only a few years on the books, produced no
maps, and brought few people to court, it had a significant impact on race relations in New Orleans
and the Central City neighborhood. Until the passage of the zoning ordinance in 1924, no notable
instances of racial violence had occurred in Central City since the Robert Charles riots of 1900.
Shortly thereafter, several bombings targeted African American businesses and residences on the
fringes of Central City, bordering white neighborhoods.55 Apparently there were no subsequent
bombings, but the message was clearly sent to the African American community, as in other cities,
Hastings, 2004; Hirsch, 1992
“Supreme Court Lifts Negro Ban”, The World, New York City, March 15, 1927, Papers of the NAACP (microfilm
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that individual acts of violence could be used when institutional tools for segregation were not
legal.56
Real estate professionals in New Orleans pursued alternative mechanisms for controlling the
minority “invasion” even before the ordinance was struck down. After the ordinance suffered its
first defeat by Judge Cage in New Orleans, the Moran brothers—“real estate agents of considerable
experience”57—outlined a plan to segregate neighborhoods without legislation. Termed the “Moran
recommendation” by The Times-Picayune, it advocated for a committee composed of the Real
Estate Agents Association, the Insurance Exchange, the City Homestead League, the General
Contractors Association, the Contractors and Dealers Exchange, and the Louisiana Bar Association
to:
Specifically denote residential areas for whites and colored. Such ones
established, the next step will be for individuals and associations who perform
any of the functions incidental to ownership to subscribe to pledge not to
participate in any transaction in which either white or colored would attempt to
obtain residence in any section reserved for the opposite race. The real estate
man would decline to sell or lease, the lawyer to examine title, the notary to
pass the act, the insurance man to protect, the architect to design or remodel,
and the homesteads to grant loans, where any such invasion would be
intended. Cooperation along these lines would be more effective than formal
law, and public opinion would enforce the decisions….The outcome would
guarantee that both races in New Orleans would continue to reside here in
peace and tranquility58
Even with the defeat of the racial zoning ordinance, realtors knew that public and private
cooperation was “more effective than formal law.” The Moran recommendation was an act of real
estate collusion against the entry of African Americans into the housing market, which significantly
impacted the ability of Central City residents to secure a mortgage, as shown in the subsequent
section.
Although the racial zoning ordinance did not succeed in New Orleans, the effects of zoning
and land use planning achieved some of the segregationist‟s vision of hemming in African American
neighborhoods. Hastings (2004) analyzed maps over several decades following the passage of the
city‟s first zoning ordinance in 1929. Commercial and residential developers in the Central City area
successfully negotiated commercial buffer zones that had the intended effect of concentrating the
African American community within well-defined areas. In addition, Central City was one of the
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many African American neighborhoods in New Orleans to suffer the consequences of interstate
highway development, which razed communities and contained the segregated residential
communities both physically and psychologically.59 And so, even without a racial zoning ordinance,
affluent whites structured the zoning code and the “planning process in the service of apartheid.”60
The types of actions seen in New Orleans during the 1920s played out across the nation as
the Supreme Court struck down racial zoning in one Southern city after the next. “The movement
toward legally sanctioned housing segregation ended, and thereafter racial segregation in southern
cities was accomplished by the same means as in the north: through violence, collective anti-black
action, racially restrictive covenants, and discriminatory real estate practices.”61 Whites in New
Orleans were far more successful segregating neighborhoods using these other racist methodologies.

Racially Restrictive Covenants & Redlining
The language and logic of zoning inspired powerful real estate professionals and lenders to
develop methods for segregating New Orleans‟ neighborhoods. Influenced in part by racist zoning
advocates and economists who believed in the “market imperative” of housing segregation, realtors
incorporated racist methods into their appraisal of housing markets. These theories postulated that
the presence or “invasion” of minorities, primarily African Americans, irreversibly led to
neighborhood decline and property value losses. By 1924, the National Association of Real Estate
Boards (NAREB) codified their racial bias of neighborhood decline in their code of ethics,
“prohibiting realtors from moving African Americans into white neighborhoods.”62 By the 1930s,
the segregationist theories of NAREB and real estate economists became a primary tool in federal
housing policy during the largest expansion of homeownership in the history of the nation.63 The
first tool for racial segregation used by real estate professionals, however, was the racially restrictive
covenant, a document that forbade owners of property indefinitely from selling the property to
people of color.
In 1909, the Gentilly Terrace Company developed the first racially restricted development in
New Orleans in the newly drained swamps towards Lake Pontchartrain. The advent of the
mechanical pump and the growing popularity of restrictive covenants coalesced into a radical new
Hastings, 2004; Unified New Orleans Plan, District 2, Introduction, p. 17.
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tool for confining African Americans to existing neighborhoods, and allowing for whites to move
freely to the suburbs.64 In Central City, African Americans were constrained by restrictive covenants
on the northern portion of the neighborhood, as evidenced in zoning documents from the 1920s.
The Louisiana Realty Company declared to the zoning commission that it “imposed its own
regulations in the form of racially restrictive deeds on its tract along Louisiana Parkway north of
Claiborne Avenue.”65 These early restrictive covenants in New Orleans dramatically shaped the racial
demographics of New Orleans‟ expanding neighborhoods, but their effects paled in comparison to
the structural restrictions placed on African American homeownership by mortgage lenders and the
federal government.
During the Great Depression, new methods for expanding homeownership and controlling
foreclosures arose concomitantly with new forms of discrimination in the housing market. In 1933,
the federal government created the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) with a single task in
mind—to purchase bad mortgage loans and refinance them as long-term, low-interest rate, fully
amortized loans.66 Tragically, the HOLC also developed the racist language, biases and economics
of the real estate profession into federal policy.67 The HOLC‟s simple equation for homeownership
came with the “argument, first codified by economists and realtors, that racial discrimination was
not a matter of ideology or personal preference but of economics.”68 In coordination with the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the HOLC developed the first federal appraisal system for lending
to homeowners based on perceived lending risk. With the creation of four color-coded categories to
designate neighborhoods by risk, the national system of redlining became federal policy. Category
D, which was coded in red and termed “hazardous,” was attached to “virtually every majority-black
or racially mixed neighborhood” and systematically denied federally insured mortgages.69 The
HOLC created the first “Residential Security Maps” redlining neighborhoods in New Orleans,
which were “widely circulated throughout the lending industry.”70 As shown in Figure 2a, Central
Lewis, 2003, p. 67
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City—with the exception of a small area of wealthy homes along Baronne and Carondelet Streets—
is contained entirely within a redlined area. Thus, the HOLC‟s system for preventing investment in
African American communities directly impacted Central City beginning in the 1930s. Much as the
Moran recommendation envisioned in the 1920s, government officials, banks, realtors, and
developers denied housing to African Americans based on race.

Figure 2a. HOLC Residential Security Map of New Orleans (detail), Circa 1930s. Central City is marked in red by the
location D-2 to the left of center. Central City‟s triangular boundaries are Louisiana Avenue to the West, Earhart to the
East, and St. Charles to the South. Full New Orleans map shown in Appendix A. Map located in the cartographic and
architectural holdings at the National Archives in College Park, MD.

As the HOLC‟s stop-gap solution proved that refinancing loans could stabilize some of the
housing market, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) took the reins and vastly changed the
urban form in America, and the racial landscape with it.71 The FHA perfected the language of racial
exclusion in its Underwriting Manual and expanded its use to all facets of the private mortgage lending
71

Freund, 2007; Immergluck, 2004; Massey and Denton, 1993

16

markets. “Because of this interdependence, the lenders of noninsured mortgages adopted the same
racial proscriptions that guided FHA appraisal and lending activity,” which essentially normalized
and codified redlining in housing markets across the country.72 The FHA map in Appendix B, when
compared to the HOLC redlining map, clearly shows that redlining affected the major suburban
building activities in New Orleans. All private suburban housing developments, bolstered by FHAinsured mortgages, avoided redlined neighborhoods in the city.
As the federal government continued to influence suburban housing markets in the 1940s
and 1950s, the effects of redlining spread through all of New Orleans. In the Post-World War II
environment, redlining magnified the process of segregating neighborhoods, increased racial
turnover, and also exacerbated poverty in Central City:
The racially discriminatory underpinnings of the federal credit policies had the same results
in New Orleans as in the rest of the country. Years later, a municipal assessor recalled that
„10,000 GI‟s returned to New Orleans ready to settle down. And they could not get a
mortgage in central city, the Irish Channel, the Lower Garden District [the older sections of
the city with historically racially mixed population patterns]. Many of these men went to the
new subdivisions in Gentilly or Jefferson Parish‟….Moderate-income white families found
apartments in attractive new developments, often built with federal mortgages. No such
options existed for blacks.73
Whereas the ethnic whites in the Dryades Street neighborhood were able to move to the suburbs,
African Americans in Central City could not become homeowners, whether they left or stayed.
“The white market is preferred by builders because of its stronger and more varied housing demand,
fewer difficulties of selling and financing, and greater abundance of good building sites.”74 One of
the only opportunities for African American residents to obtain a mortgage was with African
American lending institutions—primarily insurance companies—but their capital reserves were far
less and there was reportedly little enthusiasm from residents to invest in the institutions.75
Working in conjunction with redlining, racially restrictive covenants further hindered
mobility for African Americans. This practice continued into the 1950s in New Orleans, as
covenants openly denied private market housing to middle-class African Americans who wanted to
live in the city‟s expanding suburban communities.76 After considerable controversy and political
maneuvering, one African American suburban development was built, called Pontchartrain Park,
which was for the African American elite in New Orleans. It was off limits for a vast majority of the
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African American population in the city, especially the underemployed or working class of Central
City.77 Even though the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited racially restrictive covenants in 1948, the
FHA and suburban developers continued to use them until realtors found other tactics for racial
exclusion.78 As a result, only the most affluent African Americans in New Orleans could enjoy the
suburban lifestyle spreading throughout the metropolitan region.
Housing discrimination—especially as a result of FHA redlining—drained Central City of
stability and wealth. As late as the 1970s, many in Central City “found it impossible to obtain a loan
from a bank or homestead.”79 Central City‟s few homeowners consequently could not obtain loans
to keep their homes up to code. Renters, on the other hand, suffered from the presence of
slumlords that contributed to blight and neighborhood decline, and sent clear signals to lending
institutions to further redline and disinvest in the neighborhood.80 As a result, “the fact that
federally subsidized „private‟ housing was closed to blacks was one of the factors increasing black
ghettoization during this period.”81 Overcrowding, wealth-building constraints, unemployment, and
deepening poverty all factored into the growth of residential ghettos developing across the United
States as suburban developments were off-limits to African Americans and inner city neighborhoods
were redlined by mortgage lenders and the government.82 As a result, many neighborhoods were
stripped of stability and much of their middle-class constituency, while also limiting the gains in
equity for African Americans homeowners. These generational problems resulted largely from
public and private housing market discrimination.83
In response to widespread complaints of housing discrimination, several studies were
conducted in New Orleans on redlining. The Urban League found widespread discrimination and
logged grievances against the FHA, VA, and real estate agents.84 Another study found “covert racial
discrimination among realtors and lending agencies.”85 As late at 1978, New Orleans Mayor Ernest
Morial called “redlining a „considerable problem‟ in New Orleans.”86 These studies, however, did
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not stop the practice of covert discrimination, nor did they spur reinvestment in Central City. By
the time that the FHA increased their lending to African American communities and the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 required banks to lend to disinvested communities, Central
City‟s population was deeply poor and could not obtain traditional mortgage products.
The most insidious reason for the continued presence of redlining and housing
discrimination is that mortgage markets veil racial inequities in economic terms. “FHA operations
began to racialize whites‟ vision of housing economics during the 1930s, as the agency‟s story about
race, property, and housing was rapidly inscribed in a very powerful state apparatus, whose
representatives insisted that it was economics and the market, not individuals and their prejudices,
that were setting the rules.”87 This national economic context is relevant to New Orleans, as the
“Negro cannot expect much from the building industry on economic grounds alone.”88 This
structural logic of racialized economics continues to underpin the mortgage finance system even
today.

Public Housing and Central City’s Official Segregation
New Orleans‟ public housing was segregated from its inception and stayed so throughout its
entire history. Nearly defining residential segregation, public housing was one of the most powerful
forces eroding the traditionally integrated neighborhoods in the city and played a significant role in
the structural constraints that prohibited African Americans from building wealth and rising out of
poverty.89
Central City hosted some of the first public housing developments in the United States. In
1937, Congress passed the Wagner Act, providing the first stable funding source for public housing
and criteria for site selection, slum clearance, and tenant eligibility. Remarkably, the Wagner Act
provided for a non-discriminatory hiring policy for the construction of public housing, a fact that
was uncommon in the New Deal job programs.90 Federal officials, however, allowed local housing
authorities to segregate the housing units themselves. New Orleans was the first city to receive
funds for public housing, and began the process of site selection and slum clearance with
exceptional speed after receiving funds in 1938. The first two projects identified and built were the
St. Thomas development in the Irish Channel for whites and the Magnolia development in Central
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City for African Americans. The neighborhood selected for the Magnolia development housed a
diverse array of African American communities, ranging in quality from tenement slums to the
middle-class homes of African American doctors and professionals. Within 36 days, the Housing
Authority of New Orleans (HANO) evicted all of the 862 households in the footprint of Magnolia.
These evictions began the mass exodus of the African American middle-class from Central City.91
Following the opening of Magnolia, African American leaders pushed the Housing
Authority of New Orleans (HANO) to create public housing management jobs for African
Americans. After initial negotiations for management positions, the HANO “board rapidly proved
unable to live with this arrangement….After some debate, they passed a new resolution specifying
that blacks would be employed in management at Magnolia…but that both projects would now be
grouped „under the supervision of a Management Supervisor…of the white race.”92 White
supremacist pressures continued in HANO, leading to the same policies of job discrimination for
supervisors, interviewers, and field workers in connection with tenant selection. Thus, not only
were the projects‟ residents segregated by race, only whites staffed higher management positions for
decades.93
Despite the segregation of public housing and job discrimination, public housing seemed to
be highly regarded by the residents. Many of the African American residents in public housing even
exceeded the income quota built into the 1937 Wagner Act‟s regulations and there seemed to be a
higher level of payment stability in African American public housing than in white developments.94
Many residents held stable jobs as unionized longshoremen, which had some of the highest wages
that working-class African Americans could earn at the time.95 In addition, progressives in New
Orleans ensured that the public housing was aesthetically pleasing, a rarity under the Wagner Act‟s
austere funding guidelines.96 Even the growing unease among African American leaders about the
future of residential segregation did not dispel the general sense that “the segregated housing
projects of New Orleans came closer to true equality than most public institutions ruled by the
„separate but equal‟ doctrine.”97
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After World War II, public housing in New Orleans changed rapidly with the enforcement
of income quotas at a time of growing housing shortages. HANO evicted stable tenants with jobs
to make way for a long list of eligible tenants, many of whom were poor, jobless, and unskilled
migrants from rural parishes. As described in the previous section, widespread housing
discrimination in the private rental or homeownership market prevented the evicted African
Americans from obtaining housing. White tenants, on the other hand, could obtain mortgages or
move freely in rental markets. Thus constrained, many ventured to available units in downtown
neighborhoods that were experiencing rapid racial transition. Those left in Central City with eligible
incomes could also now live in two more public housing developments built between the 1940s1960s—Calliope (or B.W. Cooper) and the Guste (“High Rise” and “Low Rise”), both of which
bordered Melpomene (later MLK). Thus the combined effects of income quotas and private
housing market discrimination played a large part in Central City‟s shift from a relatively stable
working class community into a racially segregated and chronically underemployed ghetto.98
In 1965 New Orleans‟ public housing was legally desegregated, but it was entirely segregated in
reality. Nearly all residents across the city in public housing were African American. “Whites simply
did not need public housing as much as blacks did. By 1969, in the New Orleans metropolitan area,
only 8 percent of whites lived below the poverty line, and most of these were outside the city limits.
In contrast, almost 40 percent of blacks lived below the poverty level, and most of them were in
Orleans parish.”99 A large contributing factor besides the housing discrimination in the rapidly
expanding suburbs of the 1960s was that “Blacks remained excluded from participation in the
economy.”100 The inter-institutional structures of the housing and job markets in New Orleans were
firmly in place:
Through war and recovery, new wards and recessions, through social
transformation, through civic modernization, the whites found the projects
to be a path upward and, in general, the blacks did not. There was a wall
surrounding those housing projects. It was not of the Housing Authority‟s
making. If it was invisible, it has proved tremendously hard to penetrate
nonetheless.101
This so-called invisible wall is the structural constraints of the discriminatory housing market, the
white suburban color line, job discrimination, and other ways of constraining African American
mobility in the inner city.
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By the 1960s, Central City reflected the “ghetto” conditions of African American
communities throughout the country, characterized by “large, impoverished, spatially constrained,
and racially segregated residential communities.”102 The deleterious effects of ghetto and underclass
life are well documented,103 but it is important to note “Racial segregation—and its characteristic
institutional form, the black ghetto—are the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation
of black poverty in the United States.”104 The segregation of African Americans in Central City—
particularly through the concentration of underemployed people in public housing—formed one of
the most enduring structural ghettos in New Orleans (Racial concentrations in Central City shown in
Figure 2b).

Figure 2b. Racial change in the Central City area of New Orleans from 1940-2000. Size of circles connotes density of
people in census blocks. As this figure shows, Central City‟s population shrunk dramatically between 1940-2000.
Reproduced with permission by Campanella (2006, p. 275)

After decades of wrangling with HANO over hiring African Americans for management,
both Magnolia and Calliope were handed over to resident management organizations in the 1970s,
“which held substantial promise of improving organization and internal community atmosphere.”105
However, with Central City already in a cyclone of decline, the changes followed the adage „too little,
too late.‟ Even with “changing political power structures…the structural forces which had turned
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public housing in this direction ran deep in every American city.”106 These structural forces aligned
economic discrimination and private housing discrimination into a powerful force that kept Central
City in a state of deepening poverty, which would not relent for decades.

Conclusion
Discrimination in public and private institutions caused decline in African American
business, zoning inequities, redlining, and public housing concentration in Central City. These
institutional interactions affected housing investment decisions, economic development, and the
mobility of African Americans in a rapidly segregating city. Although early civil rights attorneys and
leaders successfully overturned many of the zoning ordinances, the structures for private and public
housing discrimination were well established and continue to the present day. All of these factors
played a role in the developing African American response to segregation during the Civil Rights
Movement, but they also limited the gains made by African Americans as they broke the bonds of
Jim Crow.
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The ghetto and barrio have replaced Jim Crow as the symbols of racism, and the struggle to
radically reconstruct the inner city built environment has become the postmodern equivalent
of the Civil Rights Movement.107

3
Reclaiming the Streets: The Civil Rights Movement in Central City
The Civil Rights Movement challenged and overcame institutionalized Jim Crow laws that
prevented African Americans from expressing the fullness of their political rights. However, the
movement struggled to overcome the fundamental structures in housing, jobs, politics, education,
and economic development. Central City hosted many of the civil rights activities in New Orleans
during the 1950s and 60s, but it also suffered from some of the most extreme effects of segregation
and persistent structural racism. Since the turbulent 1960s, African American leaders in Central
City searched tirelessly for ways to overcome structural restraints, one of which tied civil rights
commemoration to the revitalization of the neighborhood.
After Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.‟s assassination, African American leaders commemorated
the civil rights struggle by naming streets in his honor, followed by the commemoration of local civil
rights leaders. Although the renaming of streets is of increasing importance to African Americans
publicly honoring their history and struggles during the Civil Rights Movement, commemorations
are marked by decades of racial and political tensions that limit the location and scale of the street
renaming. In Central City, as in cities around the country, political battles restrict commemoration
to less prominent boulevards or streets that remain within segregated African American
neighborhoods. The result is that the boulevards are often stigmatized, or “branded,” with
attributes of an African American ghetto that affect the neighborhood‟s redevelopment potential.108
Moreover, the commemoration of civil rights leaders brought out struggles between powerfully
connected historic preservationists—who held deep beliefs in maintaining their version of New
Orleans history—and civil rights leaders who envisioned a new landscape and political order for the
community and the city. The political structures in New Orleans ensured that commemorative
streets would not cross into the affluent white parts of the city, affecting both the location and scale
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of the civil rights commemoration and further demarcating the economic and racial segregation of
Central City.109
This chapter begins with an account of the civil rights activities in Central City that
challenged Jim Crow and the structures that prevented African Americans from full participation in
our democracy and economy. The chapter transitions into the politics of commemorating the Civil
Rights Movement in Central City and how leaders tied newfound political power to neighborhood
revitalization efforts. In so doing, Central City leaders battled against the political and structural
limitations of commemorating the Civil Rights Movement after the fall of Jim Crow.

The Civil Rights Movement in Central City, New Orleans
The Civil Rights Movement is often equated with the legislative successes of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. There is often less
recognition of the struggles for jobs, housing, and equitable economic development that
accompanied these monumental changes to American domestic policy. For several decades, African
American civil rights and union leaders gauged their full integration into American society by the
ability to secure jobs, adequate housing, and an equitable share of federal resources. Martin Luther
King, Jr., himself, learned early in his career the importance of jobs and housing, and later came to
ardently support a platform of “full employment” and “open housing” for all citizens.110 Despite the
successes of the Civil Rights Movement, the realization of full employment and open housing was
truly a dream. In reality, low-income African Americans found little consolation in the federal jobs
programs during the 1960s and housing policy since 1968.111 Time and again, civil rights leaders
organized protests and boycotts in support of fair employment, jobs, and decent housing for African
Americans, but each time the structures of the discriminatory job and housing markets obstructed
them. In Central City, decades of struggle for jobs and housing produced few well-paying jobs and
scant decent housing. Nonetheless, the neighborhood‟s activism also produced some of the first
demonstrations in New Orleans that were critical for the desegregation of public accommodations
and pressured city officials to address some of the job and housing concerns over the decades to
come.
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Most of New Orleans‟ prominent civil rights leaders of the first half of the 20th century were
Creole elites from the Downtown neighborhoods. Many Creole leaders practiced law for the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and fought against Jim
Crow laws, such as the racial zoning ordinance described in Chapter 2. The Civil Rights Movement
in New Orleans took a distinct turn in the 1950s, however, in the Uptown neighborhood of Central
City with the rise of forceful Protestant ministers and a budding militant student population.112
One of the most prominent civil rights leaders in New Orleans was a Protestant minister in
Central City by the name of Reverend Abraham Lincoln Davis. Rev. A.L. Davis (Davis), as he was
known, was beyond simple categorization. Born in rural Louisiana, Davis became one of the most
prominent Uptown Protestant ministers in the city. Moving to New Orleans in 1936 at the age of
twenty, Davis showed himself to be a forceful voice for civil rights. Davis was an activist minister at
a time when activism was not popular in the church. In addition to his vocal criticism and public
protesting during the Civil Rights Movement, Davis showed considerable skill as a racial
negotiator—a fact that often got him criticism because of his shaky alliances with white racial
moderates. Davis was also very politically active, which helped him win influence, but eventually
caught him in struggles with African American opponents increasingly frustrated with the pace of
change in Central City.113
In 1955, the Montgomery bus boycott pressured that city‟s segregation policies and led to
one of the most successful economic boycotts and one of the most high-profile court cases of the
Civil Rights Movement. This massive local demonstration of unity catalyzed other boycotts around
the country, inspired innumerable African Americans to stand up to the oppressive conditions of
Jim Crow, and launched the career of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The actions in Montgomery
greatly inspired A.L. Davis, so much so that he hosted Dr. King and 100 other Southern civil rights
leaders on February 14, 1957 at his New Zion Baptist Church in Central City. At this meeting, the
attendees voted to create the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which would
become one of the most powerful and effective civil rights organizations in the decade to come.
“Initially conceived as a means of capitalizing on the success of the Montgomery bus
boycott…SCLC‟s founding gave a stimulus to protests against bus segregation in Louisiana.”114 Just
a little over a year after SCLC‟s founding, Davis and other leaders successfully and peacefully
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integrated the New Orleans bus system on May 30, 1958 through a “friendly lawsuit”—a surprising
victory that did not require major mobilization and was a mild antecedent to the virulent reactions of
whites to integrating schools and public accommodations during the 1960s.115
When court-ordered school desegregation began in 1960, whites reacted violently in New
Orleans. Mothers of white children threatened and attacked four African American girls who were
the first children to enter an all-white school in the Lower 9th ward, which at the time was a working
class white section of town. This incident received national attention and quickly changed the
perception of New Orleans as being a racially moderate city. The process of school desegregation in
New Orleans also followed similar patterns seen around the country, where whites fled public
schools and African Americans were left with an inferior education system and decrepit schools—
directly impacting generations of African Americans in finding employment and other opportunities
that white counterparts enjoyed.116
In these increasingly tense times of race relations and desegregation, civil rights leaders in
Central City organized the first major boycott in New Orleans (Figure 3a).117 Although Dryades
Street was the primary African American shopping district, the white businesses notoriously did not
hire African Americans to work jobs above the menial level. In response to widespread
discriminatory hiring practices along Dryades Street, several activist Protestant ministers and lawyers
from the surrounding neighborhood—including the Reverend A.L. Davis—organized into a group
called the Consumer‟s League. As one of the original organizers of the boycott recalled:
After fruitless negotiations with the Dryades Street merchants, the group threatened to
demonstrate. The merchants‟ answer, Mitchell recalled, was, „Go on ahead. Demonstrate,
and march all you please. You‟re not gonna keep the black folks off Dryades Street.‟ The
Consumers‟ League challenged the merchants, and „we organized the first march that I can
remember in the city of New Orleans for civil rights.‟118
On the other side of the counter, the predominantly Jewish merchants recalled the situation
somewhat differently. Dryades Street merchant Lestor Gerson “[Shook] his head in recalling the
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incident. „We had a bad situation that existed between the merchants and the NAACP, because they
wanted an immediate change from stores with all white employees, to black and white.‟”119
The Consumers League galvanized the historically divided African American community by
organizing Protestant ministers, residents, congregation constituents, Creole lawyers, and students
from all over the city to boycott the white business owners. The boycott started at the beginning of
April of 1960. Within days, many of the businesses saw profits drop as much as $3,000.120 By May
of 1960, boycott leaders counted as many as 30 newly-hired African Americans on Dryades Street.121

Figure 3a. Dryades St. Boycott, 1960. New Orleans Public Library City Archives

Several young students were deeply influenced by their experience in the boycott on Dryades
and the increasingly radical actions of students across the country. Several students in particular—
Oretha Castle, Rudy Lombard, and Jerome Smith among them—formed a local chapter of the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1960. CORE organized a racially diverse group of students
to perform sit-ins and demonstrations on Canal Street to challenge segregation at the heart of the
white power structure. Rather than being “centered in the black community, led by ministers and
doctors…[t]he sit-ins downtown were different. „To talk about hiring some black clerks in stores in a
black neighborhood was one thing, but to start talking about social change, social life, going to the
same restaurants, was considered to be really radical,‟” one civil rights leader recalled.122 Despite
physical intimidation and numerous arrests, students repeatedly pressed the white political and
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business leaders to integrate all public accommodations.123 Integration of public accommodations
was guaranteed with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but white businesses still persisted in
their segregation of certain private facilities. Not until 1969, when the New Orleans City Council
passed a strict local Public Accommodation Ordinance expanding the 1964 Civil Rights Act‟s scope,
did public accommodation segregation officially end.124
Even with integrated public accommodations, the hiring of African American employees in
white businesses did not continue as smoothly outside of the Dryades Street area. As noted in the
previous chapter, higher-level management jobs were strictly segregated by race in New Orleans.
This job segregation also applied to the city‟s civil service employees and most private employment.
These conditions significantly affected the ability of African Americans to build wealth and climb
out of poverty like their lower-class white counterparts. “Segregation and social exclusivity deeply
affected economic options. With a few exceptions for professionals and small business owners,
black residents usually represented a low-cost labor force that served others, rarely with access to the
real sources of economic, and therefore political, power.”125 These acts of discrimination in the job
market amounted to willful economic racism and systematic exclusion, keeping African Americans
unemployed or in low-wage jobs and thus in a perpetual state of poverty.
The deepening condition of poverty in African American communities was well known to
leaders in New Orleans, but they were also on the agenda of national leaders, including Dr. King.
King knew that “low southern wages were „not an accident of geography‟….Historically confined to
unskilled jobs, black workers were vulnerable to structural unemployment….This was not simply a
paradox of poverty amid plenty. American abundance structured black poverty.”126 Sharing this view,
Oretha Castle argued, “this country is a deeply racist country. In some ways, I think that is the
root…the economic system, and, in some ways, the political system builds on and translates that.
The root problem of this country is that it‟s racist to the core. Every day this country is becoming
more and more regressive, with the economic system becoming more and more oppressive.”127
Civil rights leaders, by tying together a trenchant analysis of segregation and economic deprivation,
forcefully expressed the structural relationship preventing African Americans from truly gaining
freedom from racism and poverty.
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In New Orleans, civil rights leaders maintained pressure on political elites to ensure jobs for
African Americans. In August of 1963, after years of working tirelessly to get the city of New
Orleans to hire African Americans, A.L. Davis and other leaders announced that they reached a deal
with the city that would remove racially discriminatory signs on city property, „refrain from
appealing‟ court orders that desegregated local institutions, hire applicants to the civil service on the
basis of „qualifications‟, hire black firemen and sanitation workers, and the city would „refrain from
harassing businessmen who desire to desegregate hotels, motels, restaurants, and other facilities.‟128
By September, civil rights leaders realized that the demands would not be met on their terms. Six
civil rights groups organized the “Freedom March” from Shakespeare Park in Central City to City
Hall on September 30, 1963—a little more than a month after the March on Washington—that
drew between 10,000 and 15,000 people and was considered the largest demonstration of its kind in
New Orleans‟ history.129 Among others, the Reverend A.L. Davis and Oretha Castle led the march.
At City Hall, the outspoken Oretha Castle declared that: “as long as we are held in economic and
political slavery, they [the whites] aren‟t free either.‟ She ominously predicted that there would be no
peace „as long as Negroes are forced to live as we are now.‟”130 Even though a few of the demands
were met, the hiring of African Americans by City Hall would not take place in any great numbers
until the racial liberal mayor Maurice “Moon” Landrieu came into power on the wave of African
American votes in 1969.131
Despite the limited successes of the Dryades Boycott and Freedom March, jobs were
exceedingly hard to come by for low-income African Americans, even in a time of expanding federal
intervention in urban communities. In 1964, approximately three-quarters of all African American
families earned at or below poverty level wages, and almost half were actually below the poverty
line.132 In response to deepening poverty and urban uprising, President Lyndon Johnson‟s
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administration—after considerable pressure from civil rights leaders and racial liberals—embarked
on the War on Poverty (WOP). Though civil rights leaders, including King, consistently pushed job
guarantees, the WOP offered meager funds for job training and economic opportunity.133 One of
the main job programs was the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), which in theory would
train low-skill workers and then place them in the private sector for on-the-job training.134 In
practice, the program did not live up to expectations. Within the first year, Central City officials
predicted 250 job placements. When only 44 jobs materialized in the first six months, Central City
residents became enraged and a vast majority dropped out of the program. Federal and local
officials neglected to realize that “the vast majority of local CEP enrollees were African American,
yet most jobs in New Orleans beyond low-skill, labor-intensive positions were closed to African
Americans.”135 Therefore the jobs available to African Americans in New Orleans continued to be
the ones that they were already able to get. By creating untenable programs with no enforcement,
the WOP “kept the welfare state fragmented and decentralized.”136 With a fragmented federal
response to deeply engrained structural employment barriers, the white business elite in New
Orleans maintained the color line in business with little challenge from the government.
Concentrated African American unemployment during the 1950s—coinciding with port
containerization and economic restructuring—deeply affected household wealth in Central City.137
Likewise, the movement of the remaining middle-class African American families out of the
neighborhood drained both stable families and leadership. By the 1970s, in the words of Clarence
Barney, the executive director of the Urban League of Greater New Orleans, “Central City [was] the
largest blighted area in New Orleans” and Dryades was “one of the most terrible areas.”138 Central
City was becoming characterized by the following report by the Times Picayune entitled “The
Central City Dilemma:”
Just as the rubble has increased so have your chances of becoming a murder
statistic. There is really no certainty that upon turning down the next side street
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you will not be mugged or shot by someone disgusted about a rat-infested house,
the loss of a job, the lack of money or just strung out on drugs.139
With more than a decade of War on Poverty relief programs, Central City was still in a state of
decline that seemed insuperable. Clarence Barney concluded that “all the anti-poverty programs did
was provide money but left no economic institutions controlled by the people which could become
self-supporting once the money was turned off.” 140 This kept the residents in a state of poverty, but
with additional dependencies on federal funds that would soon dwindle.
Even though the Dryades Boycott secured a few sales clerk jobs and perhaps a few lower
level management positions, Dryades Street fell along with the neighborhood as a whole. As shown
in Figure 3b, the business activity on Dryades peaked in 1952-1953, but sank by 1958, and then
dwindled over the several decades until the final plummet in the 1990s. According to Campanella
(2006), the Dryades Boycott signaled to Jewish business owners that times were changing. They
subsequently moved to other Uptown and suburban neighborhoods. Jewish merchant Lestor
Gerson remarked that “People didn‟t want to come [to Dryades] because they didn‟t want to shop
here under that tension. They‟d ring up and ask if it were safe to shop. After awhile they went to
shopping centers in other parts of the city.”141 Canal Street‟s integration and increased options for
suburban shopping in the late 1960s facilitated the abandonment of Dryades, which “led to the
virtual extinction of black business districts” in the city.142
Although promises of private sector job creation washed away, the WOP achieved some of
its goals in New Orleans. The program created some of the longest surviving service delivery
systems for low-income African Americans and also became one of the main vehicles for enhancing
the political power and civic participation of the African American community during the late 1960s.
In particular, the Central City Economic Opportunity Corporation (CCEOC) acted as a hub for
“self-help” activities and the funneling of federal funds to local political organizations under the
Community Action Program, which ultimately produced “several prominent black politicians”143 and
also led the fight for the commemoration of civil rights leaders and revitalization activities in Central
City.
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Figure 3b. Business Activity on Dryades Street, reproduced with permission from Campanella (2006, p. 275)

Reclaiming the Streets in the 1970s-80s
Though Central City was in a state of steady decline, there were committed activists still
pursuing ways to find a way to raise the neighborhood from the depths of poverty, unemployment,
and disinvestment. War on Poverty funds quickly dwindled in the 1970s under the Nixon
Administration, but some of the organizations still survived in Central City. The CCEOC was one
in particular that continued working in Central City pursuing street improvements and other ways of
keeping the neighborhood afloat. The CCEOC—organized around elected block leaders
representing all of Central City residents—developed African American leaders that later became
legislators and city council members. Along with the political redistricting in the late 1970s that
allowed for the first African American to sit on the New Orleans City Council since Reconstruction,
political leaders in Central City commemorated their civil rights history in a neighborhood that had a
long history of struggle against segregation. By seizing political control through the War on Poverty
programs and voting drives, the African American community overcame steep opposition to
commemorating the past.144
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In the early 1970s, the CCEOC and residents pushed the City of New Orleans to invest in
Central City‟s streets. One such street to be highlighted was the prominent residential street of
Melpomene that ran through the entire Central City neighborhood, tied together two public housing
developments, and crossed the historic Dryades Street. On February 5, 1973, a Melpomene Avenue
Improvement (MIA) Meeting between the CCEOC and several city staffers finalized a commitment
from the New Orleans Department of Streets for $150,000 in street repairs. These city funds would
be matched with $300,000 in federal funds to perform street repairs from Dryades to S. Claiborne
Ave. In addition, the federal funds could be used for a memorial “in the form of a statue or bust”
that would be placed on a two-block area along Melpomene‟s median filled with flowers, benches,
trees and shrubs. At this same meeting, “it was suggested that Melpomene Ave. be renamed in
memorial of some black leader, someone national or local.”145 Those present suggested either
Martin Luther King or Mahalia Jackson, a famous gospel singer and civil rights leader from New
Orleans. The CCEOC members at the MIA presented this to the full CCEOC board on April 13,
1973. The board passed a resolution to rename Melpomene as Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard
and to designate the neutral ground146 from Dryades to Simon Bolivar as “Freedom Walk.”147
Although the CCEOC sent the resolution to city hall, it did not succeed in changing the name of the
street under an all-white city council.148 According to the Times-Picayune in 1975, the effort was in
the hands of CCEOC leader and future councilmember James Singleton, who, as director of the
Central City Neighborhood Council, pushed the renaming of Melpomene Ave to Martin Luther
King Drive along with the placement of a bronze statue at the end of it. According to Singleton, it
was part of a larger planning proposal to revitalize Central City.149
Although African American leaders gained greater access to politics in New Orleans during
the administration of Moon Landrieu in the early 1970s, the New Orleans City Council remained allwhite until 1975. After a highly controversial redistricting plan intended to drain political power
away from majority African American neighborhoods, a vacant seat in the city council was filled by
A. L. Davis at the discretion of 6 white council members—a token to the African American
145
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community.150 Even so, interest group struggles maintained inequalities for African Americans in
the fragmented post-Jim Crow pluralist political process.151
Early in his tenure, Davis proposed a citywide holiday honoring Dr. King. In the resolution,
Davis wrote that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.‟s “enormous influence was always directed toward the
social betterment of minorities and the poor, toward breaking down the artificial barriers that
separate the races, and toward gaining universal recognition and acceptance of the dignity of all men
and women, regardless of race, color, creed, class or economic status.”152 The resolution fell flat
when Davis and other advocates suggested replacing All Saints Day—a difficult proposition in a
Catholic city—as a holiday for King.
Davis, undeterred, then took up the initiative to change Melpomene Ave to Martin Luther
King, Jr. Boulevard.153 At the urging of the City Council Research Staff (CRS), the CRS performed a
survey of businesses and residents along Melpomene and government officials prior to the
renaming. Foreshadowing the business concern surveys in subsequent battles over MLKs across the
country, the CRS collected information from the Streets Department, the Post Office, business
owners, the Planning Commission, and neighborhood residents.154 On February 5, 1976, the CRS
sent an Inter-Office Memorandum directly to Councilman A.L. Davis to inform him that the street
renaming would not be too costly or create problems for the Post Office, that only one business out
of a random sample of 8 would be financially burdened by the name change, and that numerous
residents called in support of the renaming. The memorandum also directly confronts a growing
preservationist opposition by noting other street name changes in New Orleans.155 After the CRS
analyzed the effects, the City Planning Commission studied the proposal, finding that 900 addresses
(both commercial and residential) would be affected. Perhaps avoiding controversy, “The City
Planning Commission passed on the staff‟s informational report to the council without a
recommendation as to whether the name should be changed.”156
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By the end of 1976, Davis successfully shepherded the renaming of Melpomene (between
Earhart and Baronne) through the city council. On November 8, 1976 the city council voted in
favor of the renaming by a 5-1 margin over the lone opposition of an openly racist Joseph
DiRosa.157 A dryly written and short front-page article in The Times-Picayune noted that the street
“traverses a heavily black Central City neighborhood.”158 The African American newspaper, The
Louisiana Weekly, also noted that the street is in a “predominantly black section of town”, but
remarked that “The street will keep its present name from Carondelet to the River, a more heavily
white-populated area.”159 Accommodating historic preservationists, Davis negotiated with them and
Lower Garden District residents to stop MLK before it crossed St. Charles.160 It is most likely that
Davis and other street renaming advocates thought it would be virtually impossible at the time to
build political support for a boulevard named after Dr. King that would stretch into a predominantly
white neighborhood. This was confirmed in interviews with a long-time Central City leader who felt
that white opposition would have been too intense for the ordinance to pass a nearly all-white
council. These political structures limited the commemoration of Dr. King to the segregated
neighborhood of Central City.161
The reactions to the name change from several white community members ranged from
anti-communistic to hostile preservationist to paternalistic—all imbued with racism typical of the
time. The League For Less Government Inc. complained of Martin Luther King‟s ties to
communism and warned: “If we call ourselves Christians and patriotic Americans, we have little
choice but to oppose our City Council on this action.”162 In a letter addressed to the “Members of
the City Council (Except Joe DiRosa),” a Miss Blackmore wrote:
I am a 25 year old woman, a registered voter and my degree is in
HISTORY. I can‟t believe you voted to change Melpomene to Martin
Luther King Street. I don‟t care what the name was, it was just
STUPID to mess up the street names of the Muses. It is interesting
that the Muse Melpomene stands for TRAGEDY because it was tragic
what happened!!!!!!!!!!163
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Typical of a paternalistic valuation of African American culture, a local attorney remarked,
“don‟t you think that the Blacks in this city would gain a lot of credit if they made a determined effort
to see that Martin Luther King Avenue becomes one of the best-kept streets in the City of New
Orleans.”164 A “Concerned Orleanian” wrote that Davis‟ “real concern and objective should be
directed against the so called „black youths‟ who continually roam the streets…in order to prey,
maim, and steal…. [Davis‟] real civic duty is to point out to your race the true respect for discipline,
law and order, rather than lending a hand to destroy the culture that Orleanians inherited from a
past generation.”165 Rather than recognizing the commemorative street as an opportunity to inspire
African Americans and energize efforts to revitalize the neighborhood, white opponents negatively
branded Dr. King and the boulevard. This “branding” of MLKs tends to “associate a particular,
racially coded imagery characterized by economic disadvantage and urban decay” with the
commemorative streets.166 In the case of Central City, white opponents attempted to devalue and
derail the commemoration of Dr. King and civil rights struggles. They failed in that effort, but they
successfully segregated the commemoration to Central City.
Electoral politics in Central City became increasingly contentious after Davis broke the City
Council‟s color line. In the campaign for the Council seat in 1977, Davis fended off several
challengers who claimed that his health was failing, that he was unavailable to the public, and that he
“is not aggressive in trying to deal with problems of the district.”167 One of the challengers, James
Singleton, focused his campaign on housing rehabilitation and “job standards of the service industry
so those workers can be paid better salaries.”168 In response, Davis said one of his “chief
accomplishments was getting a section of Melpomene Street renamed Martin Luther King Jr.
Boulevard” and that “he has seen to it that „some of the streets of the district‟ have been upgraded.
He said he has also worked to bring conventions to the city to stimulate the economy.”169 Davis
won the reelection, but his health dwindled and he passed away in 1978. Davis‟ legacy was cut short
and “When he died, a lot of things that he had planned just died with him,” including the effort to
fully develop the “Freedom Walk” along MLK, according to a long-time Central City leader.
The political dimensions of commemoration also erupted at that time. Community leaders,
city officials, and the CCEOC conducted meetings in the early 1970s to fund a sculpture to be
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placed at the intersection of Melpomene and Dryades, which was funded by an Economic
Development Authority grant.170 An African American professor and artist named Frank Hayden
designed an abstract sculpture of hands intermingling in a display of racial harmony. The city
unveiled the sculpture and the “Martin Luther King Walkway” along Melpomene Avenue a few
months before the city council passed the name change. When it was unveiled in August of 1976,
the sculpture immediately became the subject of much heated conversation about the proper way to
commemorate Dr. King. At a ceremony with speeches from A.L. Davis, James Singleton, and
Mayor Moon Landrieu, among others, the responses to the sculpture stole the show. One “vocal”
resident felt that “we as a people have been abstracted all our lives, it‟s time for us to be reflected
realistically. It looks like a Martian who invaded the ghetto.”171 By December of 1976, the CCEOC
already appointed a task force to “discuss the current dissatisfaction shared generally by the
community over what the monument represents.”172 As seen throughout the country,
commemorating historical figures is a highly political act and is “limited by competition and conflict
among parties of social actors wishing to narrate the past differently.”173
The derision of the abstract sculpture continued for years, until a bust of Dr. King was
erected at S. Claiborne and MLK in 1981.174 The debate over the sculpture demonstrated that the
early commemorative initiatives did not effectively organize at the grassroots level with residents,
often relying on the political muster of ministers and politicians.175 Political leaders, like A.L. Davis,
moved the efforts along, in conjunction with organizations like the CCEOC, and came into direct
confrontation with residents who wanted another kind of recognition for Dr. King and the Civil
Rights Movement.176
The bust of King catalyzed more widespread acceptance of civil rights commemoration and
conversation about the connection between commemoration and revitalization (both sculptures are
shown in Appendix C). In a showing of enthusiasm for the bust, Central City residents contributed
the $29,000 to pay for it. Thousands of people attended the unveiling on Dr. King‟s birthday, which
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was considered to be the largest MLK Day event in New Orleans at that time. At the ceremony,
Mayor Dutch Morial urged the crowd to “establish a new agenda for the decade of the 80s. Let us
talk about the issues of improved housing, better education, and sincere peace and harmony for all
of us that are this nation. Let us take care of our children and address the elements of racism and
divisiveness.”177
Central City‟s troubles deepened in the 1980s when the economy tanked and drugs and
violence rampantly swept through the neighborhood, further alienating the community from
resources and investment.178 This was also a time when Central City purged residents, losing a
significant share of its population.179 As in African American communities throughout the nation,
“Segregation concentrated the deprivation created during the 1970s and 1980s to yield intense levels
of social and economic isolation.”180 Moreover, between 1980 and 2000, New Orleans changed
from merely a segregated city to being considered hypersegregated, with African American
populations more concentrated, clustered, and isolated than ever before.181 In this context, Central
City leaders mounted another civil rights commemorative campaign to reenergize the revitalization
of Dryades Street, MLK Boulevard, and Central City as a whole.
In 1989, James Singleton, who was then the councilman from District B in Central City, cosponsored two street name changes. Singleton “became interested in applying King‟s name to the
remaining portion of Melpomene because of complaints that Martin Luther King Boulevard ends at
a white neighborhood.”182 Originally the ordinance proposed extending MLK all the way to the
Mississippi River through a predominantly affluent white community in Coliseum Square. This
proposal again drew fierce resistance from white residents, the Coliseum Square Association, and
historic preservationists. According to the president of the Coliseum Square Association, “We have
no problems with Dr. King….it‟s just that he wasn‟t a Greek Muse.”183 One woman wrote that: “A
compromise was reached in 1977 that would rename only that portion of Melpomene above
Baronne Street. For certain members of the City Council to come back twelve years later and try to
renege on this arrangement seems to me to be grossly unfair to the property owners and residents
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who live in the Coliseum Square area.”184 After petitions, letters, and significant public pressure,
Singleton acquiesced and amended the ordinance to rename MLK between Baronne and St.
Charles—a mere two blocks.185 According to Singleton, “„The Muses mean very little to me
personally, but I can see it makes a lot of sense to keep the name, the way the streets were done‟,
with all nine together.” The city council voted 6-0 in favor of extending MLK to St. Charles on
April 20, 1989.186 The promotion of King‟s legacy as one that attempts to bridge the segregated
residential divide was not enough to overcome staunch white cultural resistance—even that which
was allegedly race neutral.
Nationally, it is common for African American leaders to attempt to bridge distinct racial
communities, and equally likely that white opposition “scales” the extent of commemoration to
segregated communities.187 “When commemorating King, African Americans are often concerned
about the location of the named street in relation to the white community and the extent to which
the street serves as a geographic bridge between races. Accompanying the importance of naming a
long and prominent thoroughfare is the equally important desire to name a street that reaches
beyond the confines of the black community.”188 As in the case of the MLK in Central City,
commemorative streets often fail to transcend these racial boundaries. One community leader felt
that white opposition was because of Dr. King “being who he was and they just did not want that
because he was a Black man and they wanted Melpomene to stay there because that depicted white.
So they said this is alright, this is all black so you can leave it there.” Though many MLKs connect
different racially defined communities, they more often than not stop at the literal or figurative
tracks, such as the MLK in New Orleans, which abruptly stops at the Uptown St. Charles street car
line (Figure 3c). The abrupt end to MLK and the “suffering associated with King Boulevard in
New Orleans prompts us to consider how the Civil Rights Movement, both in terms of how it
changed society and how it is remembered, is a project that is far from being complete.”189
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Figure 3c. Martin Luther King Jr. and Melpomene join at St. Charles streetcar line (Author‟s photo)

Although less vehement than the open white racism in 1976, the proposed extension of
MLK brought vocal opposition from the white business community affected by the proposed name
change. The president of Mardi Gras Masquerade, Inc. (MGM)—a costume rental company located
on Melpomene—wrote in opposition to the name change, claiming, “I hope you realize the
hardships that a street change would place on MGM Costume rentals….If we lose these years of
establishment and identification with a New Orleans Art neighborhood…I must seriously consider a
move out of New Orleans.”190 In addition, several business owners, including MGM, claimed that
the business expense of changing stationery would force the closure of the business.191 Although no
national survey has been done to show the impact of address changes, anecdotal evidence found it
to be negligible.192 As seen in renaming debates around the country, “commercial interests are
consistently the most vocal opponents to having their address change, citing not only the cost and
inconvenience but also the potential stigma of having their street identified with King and, as they
Bob Cahlman, President of Mardi Gras Masquerade, Inc., Letter to James Singleton, Councilman-District B, April 19,
1989, Amistad Research Center, Files of James Singleton, Box 25, MLK Name Change folder.
191 Notes to James Singleton, Amistad Research Center, Files of James Singleton, Box 25, MLK Name Change folder.
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perceive it, the African American community.”193 As in this case, the outspoken business opposition
to MLK renaming can sometimes have “material effects”, which “influence[s] consumer behavior,
investment decisions.”194 In New Orleans, as in other cities, the branding of civil rights
commemorative boulevards resembles redlining—directly influencing investment decisions—and
also the threat of blockbusting, where white business owners flee in the face of a name change,
leaving vacant buildings in their wake.195
On the same day in April of 1989, 11 blocks of Dryades—encompassing the historic
commercial corridor—became Oretha Castle Haley196 Boulevard. Similar to the desire in the African
American community to extend MLK, some leaders wished the renaming of Dryades to extend
further “all the way to Louisiana Avenue…because it‟s still a black area.” Council member Dorothy
Mae Taylor introduced the ordinance to honor Haley—one of her long-time friends who passed
away in 1987. Taylor was quoted as saying that Haley, “brought hope to a dying city, brought hope
to people who felt they were nobodies.”197 The only opponent on the city council was Peggy Wilson
who criticized the way the name change was introduced and that she had deep memories of
shopping on Dryades in her childhood. One leader in Central City later exclaimed that O.C. Haley
was an “African American Street,”198 proclaiming that the street ultimately was now in the hands of
the African American community. Although these competing memories affected the renaming
debate, they did not seem to influence the momentum towards revitalizing the area. Both the
“proponents and opponents agreed that to make the new name meaningful, the city will have to
seek ways to upgrade the new Haley Boulevard, a long-time shopping district that has become badly
deteriorated.”199 There are, however, continuing tensions between the historic preservationists and
Central City African Americans over how to redevelop properties in the neighborhood, as will be
discussed in the following chapter.
One of the common political outcomes arising from controversial street renaming debates is
the use of a street renaming ordinance, which determines a precise methodology for renaming a
street. During the debate over renaming O.C. Haley, Councilmember Wilson was quoted as saying
Mitchelson et al., 2007, p. 123
Ibid, p. 142
195 Ibid.
196 Oretha Castle married Richard Haley and so she took the full name of Oretha Castle Haley (Rogers, 1993).
197 Eggler, Bruce, “Street renaming cut short,” The Times-Picayune, April 21, 1989. For more information on Oretha
Castle Haley‟s life and work in New Orleans, see Rogers (1993).
198 Schleifstein, Mark, “Many hope the first financial institution in a generation to set up shop on Oretha Castle Haley
Boulevard is a sign of the area‟s rebirth,” The Times-Picayune, December 11, 2004.
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that “such changes should be made only „according to established procedures.‟”200 In New Orleans,
there was clearly enough controversy over the renaming of streets, schools, and parks in the 1980s90s to create a street renaming ordinance in November of 1994.201 The history of New Orleans,
even street names, is a highly contentious and influential part of city‟s “romance, tradition and
mystique,” which is why preservationists formed a unified front against the name change.202 In many
ways, the heated debate over commemorating public space is a necessary element of democratic
participation and that:
To some extent at least, community opposition toward any naming gesture ought to be
taken into account. Imposing a name on a particular geographic community forces people to
honor and remember an individual that a majority of the affected political subdivision may
not view favorably. One might counter, however, that this is exactly the segment of the
public that could significantly benefit from exposure to certain kinds of values and diversity
through the selective naming of mainstream public facilities. Naming gestures could have a
normalizing effect on names that were previously controversial or polarizing, paving the way
for enhanced consideration, if not acceptance, of the views or values that these names
represent, after opposition subsided.203
It is unclear, however, that street renaming ordinances solve the problem of how to develop
equitable political decision-making processes for historically marginalized people. Ordinances often
require signatures or petitions from residents and so “at the heart of the ordinance issue is the
question of boundaries and who has a stake in the decision-making politics of street renaming.”204

Conclusion
The Civil Rights Movement in New Orleans began in the Central City neighborhood, as well
as the commemoration of these struggles in the form of street renaming and public art. The
movement to rename streets after Dr. King and Oretha Castle Haley arose from African American
political power struggles and organizing that came out of the War on Poverty programs of the
1960s. This newfound power allowed for the negotiation of civil rights commemoration in highly
contested arenas to literally change the physical and historical power that whites had over the
landscape.205 It did not, however, overcome the white political structures that affected the location
Ibid.
New Orleans City Planning Commission, Administrative Rules, Policies, and Procedures, March 25, 2008:
http://www.cityofno.com/Portals/Portal52/Resources/2008_RulesPolicies%20Procedures-Final.pdf. For more
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202 Lind, Angus, “Renaming streets can be a real dead end,” The Times-Picayune, April 28, 1989. Interestingly, there is
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203 Bartow, 2007, p. 951
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and scale of the street renaming. The persistent stigmatization of Martin Luther King Jr. himself
and the African American community in general, as well as conflicts over preserving the “history” of
New Orleans, perpetuated the segregation of African American heritage to Central City.
Unfortunately, the effects of dividing the street and political landscape had consequences that
renaming could not overcome, with large macro social forces such as structural racism, segregation,
and disinvestment affecting Central City from the outside as well as within.
Commemoration and politics are intimately intertwined. Central City leaders used civil
rights commemoration as a way to challenge white controlled institutions and representation of
history.206 Additionally, community leaders and residents debated the meaning and usefulness of
commemoration within the confines of segregation. Despite its limitations, civil rights
commemoration can be instrumental in challenging segregation, structural racism, and the denial of
resources to African American communities. As such, the selection and repetitive use of
appropriate civil rights narratives are important for framing the political struggles for equality. It is
most advantageous to use commemoration at politically strategic times to affect change for
segregated African American communities.
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Although much has been made of the failure of a half-century‟s
efforts to revitalize the inner city, very little has been made of the
failure to acknowledge how continued racism has defeated these
revitalization efforts.207

4
The Long Struggle for a Revitalized Central City
Revitalization efforts in Central City started more than forty years ago and persist through
each turbulent decade. Through the years, “Central City has been a target area for every style of
planning that has happened.”208 An immense amount of planning, funding, and community energy
went into the few successful and many unsuccessful anchor developments in the neighborhood.
Community-based organizations and dedicated individuals sustained the revitalization efforts with
their unceasing and evolving vision of a Central City renaissance, tying the civil rights history and
vibrant culture of the neighborhood to a growing awareness for culture-based heritage tourism.209
As a new growth industry, heritage tourism offers a potential avenue for economic development and
investment in Central City, especially in a city with a strong tourism economy. However, as this tool
for economic development spreads around the country, specifically within African American
communities in the South, competition among neighborhoods and between cities limit the tool‟s
impacts for Central City. 210 Moreover, the question remains whether an African American tourism
economy can integrate fully with the larger economy and bring an end to structural racism.
The glacial pace of revitalization often provokes criticism of neighborhood reinvestment
initiatives. These criticisms, however, often ignore the structural impediments to revitalizing a
blighted and disinvested African American community.211 As shown in the previous chapters,
structural racism created segregated neighborhoods and economies and exaggerated resource and
power inequities. In the context of Central City‟s revitalization, fragmented public policy and
planning, budget cuts, and continued economic segregation maintain historical inequities and

Ross and Leigh, 2000, p. 377
Interview with community leader
209 Heritage tourism and culture-based heritage tourism will be used interchangeably, but the emphasis on “culturebased” is to show the living culture and history, rather than static recordings of the past as in some heritage tourism
projects. For more discussion on heritage tourism, see Dwyer and Alderman (2008a) and Inwood (2010).
210 Inwood, 2010
211 Ross and Leigh, 2000; Taylor Jr. and Cole, 2001
207
208

45

structures for African Americans.212 This fragmentation created funding discrepancies and
investment constraints, impeding the ability for Central City to develop the massive resources
necessary to reach a “turning point” towards reinvestment and economic integration.213 Moreover,
mainstream neighborhood revitalization strategies do not sufficiently address the long struggle in
African American communities to overcome structural racism.214 A new revitalization and planning
movement—one cognizant of structural impediments to redevelopment, imbued with living history,
and armed with a strategy and vision for realizing a turning point—offers the potential to be a
“change strategy” in overcoming historical inequities.215 It is precisely at the intersection of history,
culture, structural racism, and planning for revitalization that we find civil rights commemorative
streets poised for such an analysis.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of some early revitalization efforts that laid the
foundation for more recent developments in Central City. Then, I review several of the most
important plans for Central City produced over the last two decades, showing the consistency of
language for revitalization around heritage tourism and the limitations of the planning process.
Finally, I review several anchor projects along Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard and MLK and the
structural impediments preventing the full articulation of Central City‟s “turning point.”
Early Revitalization Efforts
The Model Cities and Urban Renewal programs—both authorized in Louisiana in 1968—
offered a renewed direction towards housing, infrastructure, and economic development in Central
City. Numerous studies, plans, and promises were made in the early 1970s as the City of New
Orleans geared up for investing federal funds in distressed neighborhoods throughout the city.
Though some of the funds went to the housing and infrastructure improvements, the vast majority
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of federal funds went to downtown and riverfront development. Ultimately, the city‟s investment of
federal funds in major economic development and tourism—such as the Superdome and the 1984
World‟s Fair—bypassed an opportunity to address structural change for target neighborhoods.
Furthermore, rather than provide a singular vision for the redevelopment of New Orleans‟ blighted
neighborhoods, the city‟s fragmented approach to economic development and metropolitan
governance stalled early revitalization efforts.216
The most telling evidence of the City of New Orleans‟ housing priorities under the Model
Cities Program is shown in letters between Central City housing developers and Mayor Moon
Landrieu‟s office in the early 1970s. The Central City Housing Development Corporation
(CCHDC) showed frustration with the pace of housing investment and the lack of focus on lowerincome housing solutions. In the CCHDC‟s perspective, “It appears that the [housing] policy is to
assist „Private Industry‟ rather than „private owner occupants and individuals.‟”217 In another letter,
the CCHDC claimed “it was geared up to build houses with a ready market of approved buyers
when a moratorium was placed on subsidized housing in January 1973. Prior to that it was put in a
holding position by Model Cities and told to do nothing but exist.”218 The Nixon administration‟s
moratorium on federally subsidized housing in 1973 began the process of federal retrenchment in
housing policy and directly impacted federally dependent and limited capacity organizations like the
CCHDC. In an “era of fiscal austerity and declining urban resources…the political isolation of
blacks makes them extremely vulnerable to cutbacks in governmental services and public
investments.”219
Only one major housing development—Satchmo Plaza, which took 7 years to develop 34
units220—opened between the 1960s and the late 1990s in Central City.221 As shown as early as the
1950s, “despite increasing Negro political power, income and rising standards of expectation
affecting housing, the market forces at work in New Orleans still seem to be incapable of supplying
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sufficient good housing to this part of the community.”222 The private and public housing
development constraints persisted for decades as the neighborhood continued to lose its population
and the aging neighborhood became increasingly blighted. The combination of Central City‟s
isolation from private investment, fragmented public policy and planning, and dwindling public
funding sources created a toxic environment for housing development.
Some improvements along Dryades Street materialized in the 1970s. In an effort to keep
business attractive along Dryades, which already significantly declined, a partnership between the
City of New Orleans, CCEOC, Community Improvement Agency, and the Dryades Street
Businessman‟s Association invested funds in streetscaping in 1975-1976 (Figure 4a). Even with
partnerships between public and private organizations, there was apparently not enough funds
allocated for maintenance, and within a few years the plants were dying and newly installed benches
were “becoming unusable.”223 One long-time businessman along Dryades lamented the state of the
street and warned that only certain private investment strategies would renew what he called “Little
Canal.” Asked whether there was a chance for Dryades to be revitalized, he said, “Yes, the potential
is still here. But we have to get some of the national chain stores to locate here. Like Shoe Town,
Sears, or K-Mart. They would have the prestige to bring people back to Dryades. A large store
would have the impact on customers. It‟s the only salvation. The small merchant will never
improve Dryades Street again.”224 This haunting perspective forewarns of the powerful structural
impediments inhibiting African American small business revitalization along O.C. Haley.

Figure 4a. Dryades Street Improvement Project, 1975-1976. A.L Davis is 2nd from right and James Singleton
is 5th from right. New Orleans Public Library City Archives
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One plan in the mid-1970s called the Heritage Square Planning Project (HSPP) attempted to
create cultural, commercial, and housing opportunities for Central City. Sponsored by the Urban
League of New Orleans, CCEOC, and city and federal officials, the HSPP targeted a large Central
City parcel on Dryades Street for heritage tourism and mixed-use development. “The major
objective of the project is to develop a process for revitalizing the Central City Community….It
could provide a focus, a rallying point for a new sense of awareness and pride in the moment of the
black experience in our nation‟s development.”225 Even though citizen participation in the project
identified a widespread desire for “broad-based community ownership of the ventures that are
developed,”226 the heritage aspect of the plan focused on developing a “mall or strip incorporating
commercial and entertainment facilities which are oriented toward the history and culture of Black
Americans.”227 The plan does not make it clear how history or culture would influence development
in a commercial mall or strip; rather, the plan seemed to commodify the African American
experience just like in many other heritage tourism developments.228 Despite publicly funded plans
and market analyses—Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) funded the project as late as
1980229—the project required considerable private sector investment. Although it is unclear the
exact reasons for HSPP‟s failure, it is likely that private lending institutions failed to invest in the
African American businesses along a significantly disinvested corridor.230 This project would have
been the first heritage tourism anchor on the historic Dryades Street, and it offers historical context
to future plans for a cultural arts corridor.
Even though public funding for economic development in 1970s-80s prioritized massive
downtown projects, Central City successfully built some heritage tourism infrastructure (as shown in
Chapter 3). Within the context of a growing effort to revitalize O.C. Haley and MLK in the 80s and
90s, a fledgling African American heritage tourism business ventured into Central City. Called
“Roots of New Orleans,” a daily tour started in 1993 that took tourists around the city to show
“how African Americans have worked and played and contributed in New Orleans since the time of
slavery.” One part of the tour led visitors “through the heart of black New Orleans”—down
Claiborne, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard—and mentioned the
Heritage Square Planning Project, Commercial Development Analysis, M.R. Garcia and Company, Inc., June 18,
1976, pp.4-5; Jim Singleton Files, Box 37, Heritage Square Planning Project, Amistad Research Center.
226 Ibid, p. 7.
227 The Heritage Square Development Corporation, Application for Housing and Community Development Funding,
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importance of civil rights activities and landmarks in the city, such as the Dryades YMCA and the
formation of the SCLC in Central City. The tour essentially charted the existing heritage
infrastructure of the “Freedom Walk” designed along MLK and arriving at historic O.C. Haley.
According to one participant on the tour:
„There are parts of the city that people really don‟t get to see. This is like the real life New
Orleans….Most (white) people know that they (black people) were slaves and in cotton
fields. That‟s all of what most people know.‟231
Despite the creation of this particular tour in the early 1990s, the general New Orleans tourism
business, with few exceptions, rarely acknowledged important landmarks of the African American
experience. The reasons most cited for this were personal safety and the fact that “black heritage
sites have either been destroyed, neglected, or undeveloped by the city.”232 Even though Central
City played a pivotal role in the local and national campaign for civil rights, the derelict buildings,
reported high crime rates, and poverty affected its potential as a business corridor and heritage
tourism site. To reverse this trend, community organizations and political leaders envisioned a Black
Cultural Tourism District along O.C. Haley. This vision continues to unfold with each successive
plan for O.C. Haley and Central City.

The Plan Goes On…
Civil rights commemoration directly influenced planning efforts in Central City as far back as
the 1970s, but the pace quickened during the 1990s following the renaming of Dryades to O.C.
Haley Boulevard. Community organizations fused commemoration with a dynamic cultural
renaissance of O.C. Haley and Central City, changing the focus of commemoration from a static
recording of past events to a celebration of the intertwining of living culture, commerce, and history.
These organizations, and many leaders and residents in the community, participated in plan after
plan for the neighborhood and the O.C. Haley and MLK corridors. Throughout, plans for the
boulevard developed a consistent language and vision for the revitalization, which kept the
momentum for reinvestment alive, but also raises questions about who is carrying the torch of
revitalization—residents or community-based organizations—and whom will redevelopment benefit
in Central City. Moreover, the fragmented planning process in New Orleans over the last few
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decades demonstrates that traditional planning models are likely inappropriate to deal with structural
racism, segregation, and historical inequalities for African American inner city communities.233
O.C. Haley Black Cultural Tourism District (’95) and Redevelopment: An Opportunity for Renewal (’97)
Leaders in Central City created the first culture-based redevelopment plan for O.C. Haley in
1995. Motivated “out of concern for the economic survival of the Black race” and worried that only
2% of New Orleans‟ businesses were owned by African Americans, the CCEOC led the effort to
create the O.C. Haley Black Cultural Tourism District (the District).234 The District—a
collaborative effort between the CCEOC, city officials, business organizations, and African
American-owned banks—envisioned the boulevard‟s revitalization as a series of African American
owned and operated anchor projects with a “cultural-based theme” that would spark further
redevelopment. 235 “The District will highlight and profile Black culture by providing „Living History‟
to locals and visitors alike who enjoy music, food, and theatrical performances.” The purpose of
this model would be to create a “vertically-integrated tourism district” that would be a model for
“Black youth” on how African Americans can own, operate, and celebrate their own enterprising
culture. A major anchor of the boulevard would be the Black Cultural and Educational Center to
“revitalize and highlight the traditional history of jazz, and other Black culture in the District.”236
Over the course of a few years, the District plan turned into more concrete proposals in the
O.C. Haley Boulevard Redevelopment: An Opportunity for Renewal study (Redevelopment Study). The
Redevelopment Study gave further clarity to the anchor projects (but made no mention of the Black
Cultural and Educational Center) and gave details on the financing and expected leasing for the
developments.237 The Central City Councilmember at the time, Oliver Thomas, “expresse[d] the
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hope for more private investors and more government seed money” as a result of the study.238 Even
so, the Redevelopment Study identified several weaknesses with the projects, namely that the area is
“declining” with poor housing stock, that collateral is “weak,” and that there are “risks associated
with start up businesses.”239
The Redevelopment Study identified two main projects to anchor the cultural aspect of the
plan and spark reinvestment. One anchor would be a renovated historic Handelman Building,
containing a street-level restaurant and hotel suites above. According to the project‟s sponsor,
CCEOC, the development took more than 10 years to complete—with numerous financial
challenges along the way because of organizational capacity and lack of tax credit expertise—but it
now houses several mission-driven non-profits and low- to moderate-income housing units. A
companion anchor, called the Venus Gardens, was intended to be a renovated historic building filled
with commercial space and market-rate loft apartments. 240 Moved along by the financial support of
a bank, the project got off the ground quickly. The developers convinced the non-profit, Efforts of
Grace, to open Ashé Cultural Arts Center, which now owns the apartments above and rents them as
affordable units to artists. Both anchor projects from the Redevelopment Study are currently
occupied, but the plans did not trigger massive reinvestment in restaurant, music, and art
venues241—even with the financial backing of a bank. Nor did the developments bring middle-class
residents that could fill market-rate apartments. These developments did, however, trigger further
planning for the boulevard and created the first working document for a cultural arts district.
1999 Land Use Plan
The City of New Orleans‟ 1999 Land Use Plan (the 1999 Plan) for District Two includes
plans for competing neighborhoods that are often at odds over the redevelopment of O.C. Haley
and Central City in general. Tellingly, the 1999 Plan lacks any reference to the previous Black
Cultural Tourism District plans for O.C. Haley. Overall, the focus of the 1999 Plan is on public
housing redevelopment (along MLK in particular), mixed-use revitalization of blighted residential
and commercial buildings, and a particularly strong focus on historic preservation. This is not
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surprising considering the rich architectural history of the district. Preservation, however, has been a
very troublesome conversation in Central City, as the goals of white preservationists from more
affluent parts of the district often take precedence over the needs of the Central City community.
The 1999 Plan targeted O.C. Haley Boulevard for mixed-use reinvestment. There is no
comprehensive strategy or vision to achieve a fully revitalized boulevard. Blanket recommendations
for preservation of existing buildings and mixed-use development give little context or planning
goals for a neighborhood significantly affected by disinvestment and blight.242 The 1999 Plan
recognizes some inherent tensions between historic preservation and revitalization, but it does not
offer recommendations on how to reconcile the significant differences:
The main issue confronting District Two is one of balancing a dire need for redevelopment
and revitalization of the distressed neighborhoods while, at the same time, protecting and
preserving their historic character and architecture. Many local, as well as national examples
show that goals of economic development and historic preservations could, or should be
one and the same. However, the success of this “dual” approach relies on the determination
of all segments of the community to work together and articulate strategies for a successful
revitalization of the area.243
More than a decade after the 1999 Plan, with revitalization continuing to move slowly, the
recommended dual approach did not prove successful. Boasting of the power of historical
preservation as a tool for revitalization, the New Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission
claimed, “Landmark protection over the past decade has prevented this area from becoming
completely devastated.”244 Although community leaders in Central City strive to protect historic
buildings, the single biggest impediment to revitalization along O.C. Haley, according to one Central
City leader, is the dominance of historic preservationists in redevelopment decisions—just as in
commemoration decisions.245 Another leader emphasized that Central City plans prioritized people
over real estate, unlike historic preservationists.246 These debates, left open-ended in the 1999 Plan,
emphasize that traditional land use planning is unfit for “increasing justice and cooperation between
urban planners and the African American urban community” as well as reconciling differences
between politically inequitable interest groups.247 Without recognizing the inequities and history of
The 1999 Plan does not reference the dynamics or demographics of citizen participation in the planning process so it
is likely that Central City residents were under-represented.
243 New Orleans Land Use Plan: April 1999, Planning District Two: Central City/Garden District, p. 75.
244 New Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission, Central City Landmarks Designation Report, 2010, p. 6.
245 The same community leader noted that Garden District historic preservationists continue to plan for parts of Central
City without the full participation of neighborhood residents or leaders.
246 For an analysis of the economic development potential and the displacement impacts of historic preservation see
Listokin et al. (1998).
247 Thomas and Ritzdorf, 1996, p. 17.
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racism between segregated communities, the planning process is unlikely to properly address
structural racism in the African American inner city.248
Central City Renaissance Alliance Plan
Unsurprisingly, the 1999 Plan did not satisfy residents and community-based organizations
in Central City. In collaboration with the department of planning and resource development in the
New Orleans‟ office of community development, community organizations in Central City obtained
CDBG and foundation grants for a new planning process that would build capacity for
neighborhood organizations and create a vision for the entire community. This process culminated
in 2004 with the creation of the Central City Renaissance Alliance‟s Community Plan (CCRA Plan)
conducted by Concordia LLC. The CCRA Plan focused on ways that “all Central City residents can
benefit from programs that promote community connectivity, address social issues, celebrate the
neighborhood‟s culture and heritage, and prioritize the maintenance, development and use of the
community‟s physical resources.”249 As a whole, the CCRA plan created a dynamic expression of
history, visions of revitalization, and strategies to overcome impediments to equitable development.
The CCRA Plan identifies O.C. Haley as the “community‟s main boulevard” and made clear
its importance as a cultural heritage district. Noting the contributions and importance of Mardi Gras
Indians, jazz and blues musicians, and visual and performance artists, the plan calls for this “critical
mass of cultural activities” to “provide the basis for attracting cultural tourism,” which should be
“marketed locally, nationally, and internationally.”250 The vision for O.C. Haley also includes
mention of a Louisiana State Civil Rights Museum as an anchor project and the proposed Louisiana
“heritage trail.”251 Interestingly, the CCRA plan uses the U-Street district in Washington D.C. as a
model for a heritage tourism site, but does not mention how that example ultimately led to
gentrification in the neighborhood252—something that the CCRA plan attempted to mitigate by
“managing gentrification.”
Taylor Jr. and Cole, 2001; Ross and Leigh, 2000; Thomas and Ritzdorf, 1996
Central City Renaissance Alliance, Working Towards Solutions, A Community Plan, Prepared by Concordia LLC,
October 20, 2004, p. 5.
250 Ibid., p. 21
251 The actual route of the heritage trail does not include any mention of Central City and its importance for the Civil
Rights Movement in Louisiana. Sites listed for New Orleans are: New Orleans African American Museum, St. Augustine
Church, St. Louis Cemeteries, The French Market, Congo Square/Armstrong Park, and the Amistad Research Center;
http://www.astorylikenoother.com/explore/. New Orleans is also featured in a national civil rights tour, which is
shown in Appendix E.
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The CCRA‟s implementation structure, though relying heavily on community-based
organizations, focused on action committees that could keep both the momentum and resident
empowerment alive. As part of the CCRA planning process, an Action Team worked to train
resident leaders to assist with the implementation. However, in the appendix of the CCRA plan
there are numerous complaints—generated from the feedback surveys of the planning process—of
lack of authentic Central City resident participation. The CCRA plan was, in many ways, a
convening of leaders and community organizations. One community leader felt disheartened about
the CCRA‟s recent citizen engagement and was dismayed that the CCRA “really lost their way as far
as I‟m concerned. They‟re not even bringing in people in their community, much less across St.
Charles Avenue.”
The CCRA plan did, however, exemplify the growing use of community-based planning,
which grew out of the failure of traditional planning models to address the concerns in African
American communities.253 These initiatives derive “insights from the struggles of African
Americans: the battle against Jim Crow, traditions of leadership and organization, residential
segregation, and dilapidated housing. Blacks have always linked together the struggle against
poverty, racial segregation, bad housing, residential segregation, and employment discrimination and
made them part of the broader fight for freedom, democratic rights, equity, and socioeconomic
justice.”254 The CCRA plan had flaws, but it did provide a framework for a new way of addressing
structural issues and a vision for the neighborhood that did not compromise Central City leadership
values for other surrounding communities. Even though the CCRA plan laid the foundation for a
comprehensive Central City renaissance, the plan quickly fragmented in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, which disrupted the plan before it could become formalized.
Unified New Orleans Plan
Hurricane Katrina brought both devastating floods and a renewed focus and profusion of
resources for the revitalization of New Orleans‟ distressed neighborhoods. Central City received
considerable redevelopment attention, especially with concerted efforts by foundations and
community-based organizations.255 Central City seemed poised to take advantage of the postKatrina infusion of funds for redevelopment. According to one leader in the community, “We took
Thomas and Ritzdorf, 1996
Taylor Jr. and Cole, 2001, p. 6
255 Greater New Orleans Foundation, “Collaborative Investing in Central City,” December 13, 2010,
http://www.gnof.org/home/collaborative-investing-in-central-city/
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advantage of the storm, but we were already moving; we were already organized.” The most
significant neighborhood-based planning initiative after Katrina, the Unified New Orleans Plan
(UNOP), delved deeply into a potential future for Central City and promised resources to realize
it.256
Unlike the 1999 Plan, the UNOP makes quite clear the importance and relevance of O.C.
Haley in the revitalization of Central City. Trumpeting the redevelopment potential of O.C. Haley,
the plan calls it “one of the most historically, culturally and artistically significant boulevards in New
Orleans.”257 The UNOP also positions it in the history of revitalization attempts and how it could
relate to larger trends for redevelopment in Central City as a whole:
Having fallen into a cycle of systemic disinvestment far prior to Katrina, the street was
receiving moderate investment Pre-Katrina. Post-Katrina, a revitalized O.C. Haley Blvd. can
be the neighborhood-level catalyst for economic development and revival for the Central
City neighborhood.258
By recognizing the boulevard‟s historic context in terms of culture as well as redevelopment
impediments and investment needs, this plan offered new direction to Central City‟s recovery and
revitalization after Katrina.
The UNOP targeted the well-known Civil Rights Museum proposal as a major driver for
economic development on O.C. Haley. Recognizing that there was “widespread support” for its
location on the boulevard, the UNOP identifies the tourist destination as another “spearhead…for
revitalization of O.C. Haley Blvd., Central City and the District.”259 Clearly doing their research, the
UNOP expands on the potential for the museum as part of the Central City‟s civil rights history,
living history and culture. As such, the museum would “celebrate New Orleans‟ role in the Civil
Rights Movement, local activists such as Oretha Castle Haley and A.L. Davis and the historic role of
O.C. Haley Blvd. in the African American Community,” as well as Mardi Gras Indians, musicians,
and multicultural connections between African Americans and the Jewish community.260
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Unfortunately, the UNOP fragmented into a “wish list” of planning initiatives and its
relatively ineffective implementation posed significant hurdles for concerted redevelopment.261
Even with the detailed history and vision for the revitalization of O.C. Haley and Central City, the
UNOP calls for additional planning of “comprehensive market feasibility” and a “comprehensive
landscape and streetscape plan.” There is no recognition for the responsible party to develop these
plans and how they would relate to the recommendations by UNOP. Despite the overwhelming
detail of the UNOP neighborhood studies, the overall “failure of local officials to designate a single
accountable agency to oversee recovery planning hindered the development of a clear, citywide
rebuilding strategy” and also negatively affected the implementation of plans at the neighborhood
scale. 262 Further issues around UNOP‟s implementation arose when the City of New Orleans
embarked on yet another planning process to create an official Master Plan. With fewer
neighborhood details but more direct impact on plan implementation, the CCRA made a special
meeting with the master plan team, Goody Clancy, to ensure that their planning efforts would be
included.263 However, it is not clear from the Master plan documents where the plan fits in or how
it is made legal under a master plan with the force of law.
Although not directly tied to any planning effort, Central City finally achieved its status as a
cultural arts corridor in 2008, among many others throughout the state. Mitch Landrieu, who was
Louisiana Lieutenant Governor at the time, created the Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard Cultural Arts
Corridor.264 Rather than require businesses to have a culture-based theme, as the original purpose
intended, the cultural arts corridor would offer tax benefits just like other overlay districts already on
O.C. Haley.265 As such, it is unclear how the cultural arts corridor status will affect the ongoing
revitalization of the boulevard and the search for anchor institutions.

Bureau of Governmenal Research, “Not Ready for Prime Time: An Analysis of the UNOP Citywide Plan,” March,
2007.
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The Central City Turning Point?: Searching for Anchor Institutions
For more than a decade, Central City organizations, residents, and local leaders have
searched for anchor institutions to hold the renaissance of O.C. Haley and Central City together and
provide focus on overcoming historic inequities for Central City residents. Anchors are a common
place-based strategy used frequently as a tool for stabilizing and revitalizing neighborhoods by
encouraging development and investment. Increasingly, anchors are used by community
organizations to “build communities that are healthy places to live and work.”266 In Central City, the
celebration of local civil rights history and Central City culture fueled the early search for appropriate
anchors, as leaders sought institutions that developed place- and people-based solutions. The
following discussion of anchors shows both the dynamic and widespread usage of the concept of
anchors, as well as the structural limitations on each type of anchor that leaders sought to locate
along O.C. Haley and in Central City, especially those with a people-based mission. Even armed
with the dynamic cultural vision for an “African American Street,” Central City still struggles to
integrate its economy with the larger metropolitan or regional economy, a key factor in ensuring the
success of the boulevard and the neighborhood.267
Community-based organizations as the early anchors
Unlike the vision for O.C. Haley as a cultural arts tourism district, many of the past and
present anchor project tenants along the boulevard are community-based organizations with peoplebased missions. The most significant early anchor along O.C. Haley is the Dryades YMCA, first
built in 1905, which is the longest-running community facility in Central City and a significant
anchor for the neighborhood. It served as the hub for many civil rights activities in Central City,
and was a frequent meeting spot for A.L. Davis and other leaders in the community during the
1950s-60s. According to one community leader, the YMCA anchored the end of O.C. Haley at
Philip Street, while the Louisiana Civil Rights Museum was to anchor the other end near Earhart. In
2000, the YMCA tragically burned down and became another focal point for reinvestment along
O.C. Haley.268 As opposed to so many other obstructed redevelopment projects along the
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boulevard, the YMCA returned within a few years and continues to anchor one end of O.C. Haley,
while the other end languishes.
In the late 1990s, several organizations opened on O.C. Haley and played a major role in the
renewed attention to the boulevard‟s potential. One of them, the Ashé Cultural Arts Center (Ashé),
opened in 1998 in the Venus Gardens development on O.C. Haley, acting as a community center,
arts and performance space, and active space for bringing the history and culture of Central City to
efforts to revitalize the neighborhood. The director of Ashé, Carol Bebelle, was an early proponent
of cultural tourism and hoped “Ashé and its neighbors will help jumpstart a movement to turn
Oretha Castle Haley into a cultural tourism corridor fueling economic development in Central
City.”269 Operating under the banner of “everything goes better with culture,” Ashé promotes and
hosts various cultural events along “the Boulevard,” which act as “gatherings” to bring people
together to dance, sing, and eat while building community (flier examples shown in Appendix D).
Ashé also collaborated with artists in the neighborhood to bring murals to MLK and O.C. Haley,
which depict the civil rights struggle and the vitality of Central City (Appendix E). Slowly, these early
anchors, and several others, helped attract more investment along O.C. Haley and provided a
framework for redeveloping the boulevard around principles of culture and the African American
experience.
Heritage tourism and the Louisiana State Civil Rights Museum
The longest-lasting, open-ended search for an anchor institution in Central City is the
proposed Louisiana State Civil Rights Museum (the Museum). The process began in 1999 when the
Louisiana Legislature passed a bill—with one lone dissenting vote—that “established” the museum
but did not create a board, specify a location or provide funds for the development of the site. Sen.
Diana Bajoie sponsored the bill and conjectured that the “most likely site appears to be someplace
on or near Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard, which is in Bajoie‟s Central City District.” According to
Bajoie, “the [Civil Rights] Movement started there.”270 From the perspective of leaders and
foundations, the museum “offers tremendous redevelopment potential and is critical to the
revitalization of the boulevard and the neighborhood.”271

Pandolfi, Keith, “Oretha Castle-Haley Boulevard in Central City being restored,” New Orleans City Business, June
23, 2003.
270 Eggler, Bruce, “Civil rights museum is revived by senator: Law would restart long-dormant project,” The TimesPicayune, May 31, 2004.
271 Defend New Orleans Blog, “Rotting New Orleans school building may be reborn as civil rights museum”, March
269

59

Despite the longevity of the campaign for the museum, there are significant factors locally
and nationally that affect the viability of a heritage tourism anchor. Even though the Louisiana
Legislature created a museum board in 2004 with members from Central City organizations, the
New Orleans School Board approved plans for redeveloping it at the abandoned Myrtle Banks
School on O.C. Haley, and numerous plans and studies agreed on the placement, the location and
realization of the Museum is still completely unresolved.272 As late as 2010—11 years after it was
originally established—the decision to locate the museum in the Myrtle Banks school was threatened
by the New Orleans School District‟s decision to demolish the building, based on the building‟s
structural integrity and overwhelming cost of renovation. Moreover, several neighborhoods now vie
for the opportunity to claim the museum for their own. According to Carol Bebelle:
“There is an energy moving behind the museum now, and so other places in the city now
want to be considered….If there‟s anything that could really stain a building with injustice
would be for this opportunity to happen and for it to be brought to another community.”
In response to the pressure from other neighborhoods, organizations like Ashé are petitioning to
keep the location in Central City because it is the “perfect location for this institution dedicated to
the advocacy for civil rights and social justice, past, present and future.”273 Nonetheless, planning
for this project is in perpetual purgatory. Even with recommendations from citywide plans such as
the UNOP, the future of the Museum‟s location is uncertain. According to one community leader,
“Some plans die, some don‟t; you see how long it‟s taking to do the civil rights museum. This stuff
does not come easily.”
At the national level, African American heritage tourism, in just a little more than a decade,
spread across the South and is now considered a “growth industry.”274 Just as neighborhoods in
New Orleans vie for the Museum, so too are cities and communities vying for economic
development tied to civil rights commemoration.275 The risk in Central City is not only that the
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Museum will move elsewhere, but also that as a tool for growth the benefits may bypass the already
disadvantaged as in other growth-oriented development.276
Lending institutions and the Hope Community Credit Union
In 1978, soon after Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), New
Orleans Mayor Ernest Morial called “redlining a „considerable problem‟ in New Orleans,” but he
“expressed cautious optimism” that loan programs tied to the CRA would alleviate it.277 By
requiring savings and loans, or deposit-based banks, to invest in the community where deposits are
made, the CRA would presumably overcome historic inequities in private lending. Unfortunately,
the CRA offered few incentives for banks to locate branches in communities without a financial
institution.278 Central City lacked a community or private lending institution for several decades and
this significantly affected residents‟ ability to secure private loans and stabilize the community.279
Most residents in Central City “found it impossible to obtain a loan from a bank or homestead.”280
These credit problems were massive in scope and affected African American neighborhoods across
the nation:
The availability of jobs and the values of homes depend on the availability of fairly priced
credit and capital. If credit becomes unavailable, then this damages the collateral and
creditworthiness of the neighborhood, potentially leading to a vicious circle in which any
lender interested in venturing into such an area is forced to assume significantly higher risks.
The abandonment of areas by conventional financial institutions then leads to social
problems that choke off more investment and lending281
As in the case of Central City, with no neighborhood-specific institution to perform lending in
Central City, both residents and businesses were left with few options to invest in their
neighborhood. This often led to payday loans and other predatory lending schemes that further
reaped benefits from low-income neighborhoods.282
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In the late 1990s, the Trinity Episcopal Church and community-based organizations on O.C.
Haley led the initiative to attract a community development credit union (CDCU). Hope
Community Credit Union opened in 2004 to cheers and high hopes, as The Times-Picayune front
page‟s title trumpeted: “Many hope the first financial institution in a generation to set up shop on
Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard is a sign of the area‟s rebirth.”283 Capitalized with deposits from
local and regional banks, the credit union‟s mission focused on inexpensive personal loans and
mortgages for Central City residents. Several years later, reality tempered the high hopes for the
CDCU. One community leader remarked that people expected a lot more from the credit union.
With limited funds to invest in neighborhoods, CDCUs rely on outside private capital sources, or
small member deposits, for loans to low-income individuals and neighborhoods.284 Tellingly, the
CCRA Plan from 2004 recommended that more private lending institutions must supplement the
work of Hope Community Credit Union and provide equal access to services and assistance with
financial literacy.285 Although it is unclear when another financial institution will locate in the
neighborhood, Central City could realize CRA benefits if Congress passes long-overdue CRA
reform. Advocates for reform argue that the CRA could fix the problem of place-based banks so
that neighborhoods can get investments from banks all over the country.286
Workforce development, retail, and the business incubator
Central City‟s unemployment rate steadily rose after WWII and continued to remain high for
decades. New Orleans‟ tourism economy contained most of the employed in low-wage jobs in the
city and a large majority of Central City residents worked in these positions.287 Efforts to confront
this generational problem started in the 1960s, but suffered from fragmented and shortsighted
federal jobs programs that could not break the employment color line.288 Even in the 60s, Central
City residents and leaders strived to create opportunities to build small businesses. In 1969, Central
City residents protested a white-owned grocery store called Opportunity Food Stores that charged
notoriously high prices. “Organizers of the boycott want nothing less than ownership of the store by
Ibid.
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the community,” however, “Black businessmen are vigorously attempting to buy their own
businesses, but they simply lack the capital.”289 The national context continued to be bleak for
African American businessmen, as they “face a wide variety of barriers and disadvantages in
attempting to establish and grow businesses, especially when compared to whites….It was precisely
because blacks had suffered from discrimination in credit, housing, employment, and other markets
that they had accumulated less capital, less education, and less business experience, on average, than
whites.”290
Planning efforts dating back to the Heritage Square Planning Project targeted retail as an
opportunity for job growth, but persistent economic barriers prevented the full realization of
African American business potential in the neighborhood. The 1999 Plan noted the neighborhood
inequity in private resources sparked by public investment: “while some neighborhoods such as
Coliseum Square and Magazine Street are experiencing a renaissance of commerce and an increase in
residential development, other areas of the District are plagued by vacancies, disinvestment and
overall decay (Oretha Castle Haley).”291 These inequities come from the structural factors impeding
revitalization and small business development in African American communities.
Central City leaders pushed ahead and continued efforts to spark retail and small business
investment along O.C. Haley. In 2003, Carol Bebelle from Ashé anticipated “black-owned
businesses [to] start opening along” O.C. Haley and that “black tourists will seek them out when
they visit the city.”292 The former executive director of the Oretha Castle Haley Merchants and
Business Association‟s claimed that “the Central City community is clamoring for retail” like
restaurants, boutiques, clothing stores, shoe stores, coffee shops, flower shops, and a bookstore.293
These types of shops could lead to increases in property value and gentrification, so the Merchants
and Business Association developed a plan for the nation‟s first community land trust for
commercial real estate to appropriately deal with affordability problems and to curtail potential
gentrification. There is cause for concern from the academic literature that gentrification could lead
to neighborhood fragmentation, displacement, and class antagonisms.294 Furthermore,
segregation—as seen in Central City for generations—“plays a key role in depriving poor black
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families of access to goods and services because it interacts with poverty to create neighborhood
conditions that make it nearly impossible to sustain a viable retail sector.”295 This structural
forewarning, especially in light of previous failures to develop an African American retail corridor,
should be taken into consideration for how to overcome economic segregation and mitigate class
antagonisms in Central City.
With the restaurant destination and workforce development anchor Café Reconcile as an
example,296 Central City leaders planned for a business incubator before, during and after the CCRA
Plan and have continued to advocate for minority small businesses venues. Currently, the Good
Work Network—located on O.C. Haley—offers business training and accounting help for small
businesses. Most recently, the New Orleans non-profit Idea Village initiated an ambitious business
plan for a business incubator and building trades center on O.C. Haley and linked the plan to the
UNOP plans recommendation for more incubators in the city. The plan acknowledges the
challenge “facing redevelopment in the City is to avoid patterns that concentrate poverty, perpetuate
racial disparities, and obstruct access to employment opportunity.” 297 The plan envisions a “catalyst
for reinvestment” sparked “by nurturing new business creation, building human capital and
promoting the physical rebuilding of O.C. Haley Boulevard.”298 This focus on human resource
development is “the foundation that must ultimately support American cities and their
economies.”299 Without it, place-based strategies will likely overweigh concurrent efforts at
developing people-based economies. Unfortunately, as with so many other ambitious plans for
Central City, this anchor has yet to be realized.
Mixed-income housing development and the Muses
Housing rehabilitation and development is critical to bring people back to Central City and
to ensure the success of commercial corridors like O.C. Haley. The most significant housing
investment in the immediate O.C. Haley vicinity is the Muses, which recently opened more than 200
mixed-income units. On a parcel of land originally purposed for an Albertson‟s grocery store in the
late 90s—which fell apart when Walmart located in the Garden District—the Gulf Coast Housing
Partnership spearheaded the development and overcame significant opposition from nearby
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Café Reconcile is a restaurant and culinary training institute for youth on O.C. Haley. For more information, visit:
http://reconcileneworleans.org/
297 Sutton, Stacey, Neighborhood Revitalization: Crafting a Catalyst for Change, Columbia University, 2007, p. 3.
298 Ibid, p. 56
299 Ross and Leigh, 2000, p. 378
295
296

64

neighborhoods. A neighborhood leader remarked, “now that the Muses project is built and people
are moving in there…I don‟t see how it can‟t [be a catalyst].” However, it is unclear how the Muses
and other developments fit into the cultural arts district plan for the area. As another community
leader noted, the housing developers in the neighborhood focus primarily on location attributes of
Central City for investment potential and not the cultural aspects of revitalization. Although this
could jeopardize some culture-based efforts along O.C. Haley, developers acknowledge the larger
market forces affecting investment in a community and can help to navigate difficult investment
decisions to keep the revitalization afloat. Even with some disagreement between community
leaders and developers, there seems to be a consensus about finding the spark to reach Central City‟s
turning point.
Although much of the revitalization efforts in Central City focus on O.C. Haley, the
residential redevelopment along MLK is vitally important for the neighborhood‟s renaissance. Just
as community leaders identified Melpomene as a significant corridor in the 1970s because of the
public housing, so too has MLK been at the center of mixed-income public housing redevelopment
plans since the 1990s. The 1999 plan identified public housing on MLK for redevelopment, with no
mention of the citywide controversy around these redevelopments.300 The UNOP Plan, however,
identified resident worries about loss of affordability in the neighborhood, and also provided vision
on how to tie the MLK redevelopments to larger transportation routes and services that would
integrate the MLK neighborhood with the city. 301 Many community leaders also openly support
mixed-income redevelopment, one of which proclaimed that:
“We don‟t want an all Black community; we want a diverse community. We want people to
see their capacity to grow. So if it works out that we have poor people, we want poor people
to be living next to and around people who are working class and middle class, and even
upper economic class.”
Nearby, the mixed-income Harmony Oaks community (formerly C.J. Peete or Magnolia) will likely
serve as a focal point for further analysis of mixed-income redevelopment in Central City.
Although revitalized public housing promises new opportunities for residents and
investment, there are significant limitations on the financing of mixed-income housing
developments. The market for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) is slow right now and
federal deadlines for the expenditure of the tax credits approach within the year, threatening the
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major public housing redevelopment along MLK.302 Although tax credits provide the vast majority
of affordable units nationally, the complexity of the tool and its dependence on larger economic
factors could affect further redevelopment. 303 Moreover, LIHTC success tends to rely on larger
housing developments, limiting its use for further housing revitalization throughout the blighted
neighborhoods of Central City. Thus, it is unclear the direction or timeline of housing rehabilitation
along the streets between major public housing redevelopments. Much of the infill housing
redevelopment remains in the hands of city officials, creative mission-driven nonprofits, and “new”
methods for blight remediation.304
Public/private partnerships and the NORA headquarters
When the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA) decided to move their offices to
O.C. Haley and invest millions of dollars in the boulevard for commercial and retail development,
many thought it was finally time for the boulevard‟s renaissance. Working in collaboration with
several organizations in Central City, including the O.C. Haley Merchants and Business
Association—a long-time advocate for a business and cultural district—NORA committed to
relocating their main office on the boulevard as an anchor commercial building. NORA committed
several million dollars of public grants and loans matched by private investment to nine property
developments along the corridor, including restaurants, office and retail space, and a live music
venue.305 In what seems to be a dedication to the original intent of small African American business
development along O.C. Haley, NORA expects to help fund cultural ventures that communitybased organizations support. It is expected that these “initial investments are designed to have a
snowball effect along O.C. Haley.”306 Despite these intentions, “The public sector developer has to
mediate between public and private interests in order to find solutions that meet both an economic
and a political bottom line.”307 This could, as before, threaten the viability of a boulevard featuring
African American businesses dedicated to culture and the arts.
Reckdahl, Katy, “HANO commits to hiring locally for public housing construction,” The Times-Picayune, February
24, 2011.
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304 Cohen, Ariella, “Rosy view of blight meets Central City‟s bleak reality,” The Lens, May 12, 2010. Several housing
organizations—such as Jericho Road Episcopal Housing Initiative and the New Orleans Neighborhood Development
Collaborative—work in Central City to provide affordable rental and homeownership opportunities, as well as organize
around resident issues in the community.
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This news was received with near unanimous cheer, with the exception of a slightly cynical
Dryades YMCA executive director, who remarked that after 39 years, “I‟ve witnessed any number of
attempts at revitalization, all of which for the most part have failed….Hopefully we can get it done
this time.”308 Despite this, most leaders along O.C. Haley expected NORA‟s decision to be the final
turnaround for the boulevard, which could then spark further investment along other corridors in
Central City. Now, nearly two years after the news broke about NORA‟s plans, it is a time of
anticipation as organizations wait for the time when the revitalization reaches the turning point.
Unfortunately, in a market downturn like the one right now, public and private sector investment in
New Orleans and in cities around the country are highly dependent on federal resources. Fickle
policy and funding environments make these anchors unstable developments to rely on, especially in
fiscally austere budget times like the present. As one leader remarked, NORA is “slow coming”
because “it‟s hard at City Hall” under the current budget cuts. Once again, exogenous structural
forces in the market, as well as fragmented policy and funding, constrain what could be the final
turning point for O.C. Haley and Central City as a whole.

Conclusion
Central City‟s turning point is still not fully realized, but there is fitful momentum in that
direction. In successive waves, O.C. Haley, and to a lesser degree MLK, have been poised to finally
achieve a turning point for the neighborhood and residents. Even with the languishing plans for
singular and large-scale heritage anchor projects since the 1970s, Central City leaders turned to a
legion of smaller-scale anchor projects that held together the vision of an African American cultural
corridor. Plans for the neighborhood grew over several decades and continued to evolve with
changing funding environments and challenges that affect all structurally limited African American
neighborhoods across the country. This period of evolution allowed community-based
organizations to create equitable plans for residents and minority businesses, as well as develop
coalitions supportive of the revitalization in Central City. One community leader grasped the
longevity of the campaign for revitalization: “This is work that is done incrementally and half of it is
learning what not to do.”
As an incremental process, planning for revitalization of an “African American Street” and a
“Black Cultural Tourism District” continues to combat the structures that segregated Central City‟s
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housing and commercial economies in the first place. Even now, Central City still suffers from
economic and residential segregation, a fact that can “largely be attributed to racism.”309 Full
economic, political, and cultural “integration can be accomplished only through a comprehensive
approach that diffuses progress throughout the entire community rather than concentrating it
among a privileged few.”310 Continued commemorative and culture-based planning efforts in
Central City will benefit from a broader perspective on how structural racism impacts community
revitalization, anchor institutions, and the housing and commercial economies of their
neighborhood.
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5
Conclusion
Considering the historical legacy of impediments to revitalization, “streets of justice” cannot
yet accurately describe the commemorative boulevards of O.C. Haley and MLK. However, even
when faced with plan and policy fragmentation, commemoration inspires resolve—even in the face
of great hardship—and frames redevelopment decisions that prove valuable in planning for
revitalization. Central City‟s role in the national Civil Rights Movement is vital to the
neighborhood‟s identity and supports the living history and culture of the community through
ongoing battles for equality. This case study of Central City makes evident that achieving justice in
segregated African American communities benefits from planning strategies that integrate an
analysis of historical, structural racism and the deeply embedded use of civil rights commemoration.
Land use tools developed in the early 20th century effectively prevented African American
communities like Central City from fully integrating into the larger economy. Racialized zoning and
real estate economics created a durable template for segregation that prevented housing investment
in Central City for generations. In its ultimate expression, the redlining of the neighborhood from
the 1930s onward—proved by HOLC maps that deemed investment “hazardous”—removed
conventional lending markets for both housing and business development.

This toxic structural

blend of public and private discrimination deepened segregation and poverty in Central City. The
tragic ironies of the Dryades Street commercial district serve as an example of the volatile interplay
of economic structures. Even as the Dryades Street Boycott momentarily bridged the bifurcated
commercial economy in New Orleans‟ second largest business district, it likely hastened the decline
of the street and, to some degree, the surrounding neighborhood.
Who defines history and for whom the history is relevant are contentious questions ongoing
in Central City and communities throughout the United States.311 Inequitable political interest
groups vie for control over the representation of history. As shown throughout the country, those
who are historically marginalized will often suffer continued inequality.312 In Central City, political
and land use decisions, imbued with overt or covert racism, segregated the commemoration of the
Civil Rights Movement, just as they influenced the segregation of housing and commercial
311
312
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economies. Even the hard-won African American political power during the 1960s-70s was
insufficient to overcome the powerful structures affecting the neighborhood.
Even with these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, community-based organizations,
Central City leaders, residents, and foundation partners persisted with revitalization and planning
efforts for more than 40 years. Through plan after plan, creative methods evolved to finance anchor
projects and take advantage of opportunities for investment. Central City framed revitalization,
heritage tourism, and social justice work around the living culture of the neighborhood, rather than
containing commemoration within the past. After observing the failure of many public sector
planning initiatives, Central City embarked on its own neighborhood-based planning initiative,
following the trends of African American communities around the country that were equally fed up
with the inequities of traditional planning methods.313 Although fragmented across numerous plans,
Central City‟s vision for revitalization guides strategies with a strong sense of heritage and culture as
assets. Continued neighborhood planning will benefit from formalized resident engagement in plan
implementation, as laid out by the original CCRA plan, to empower residents in the transformation
of their neighborhood. This could ensure greater equity in future revitalization projects, mitigation
of class tensions, and the distribution of redevelopment benefits to residents.
Commemorative boulevards in New Orleans had a clear impact on the revitalization efforts
in Central City. As such, they can be considered “change mechanisms” in efforts to overcome
historic inequities, even when the boulevards remain within segregated neighborhoods. Although
negative brands of MLK, O.C. Haley, and Central City affected redevelopment decisions, the
consistent and ubiquitous use of civil rights commemoration and representations of culture and
living history brought significant investment potential and some important anchor projects. As one
of the first layers in planning for the revitalization of the neighborhood, civil rights commemoration
demonstrated incredible versatility and sustainability in the face of political adversity and
redevelopment challenges. Community-based organizations, residents, planners, and leaders should
continue to be inspired by and driven to use commemorative boulevards to their fullest potential.
While communities use commemoration as a means to revitalize and challenge the
embedded structural inequities in American society, a continually evolving planning discipline
wrestles with how to undo its negative impacts on African American communities. Even with
visionary ideas and designs, the fragmentation and inequities built into planning and public policy
deeply diminish revitalization efforts in segregated communities. As research shows, a turning point
313
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for revitalization requires massive and concerted investment to overcome historic racism and
disinvestment.314 The fragmented implementation of singular plans slows the pace of investment,
and can derail productive changes to the local economy. It is clear that neighborhoods like Central
City will not change with one revolutionary plan. Therefore, planners must integrate neighborhoodbased plans that highlight structural factors and important historical narratives (such as
commemoration) into larger comprehensive plans to prevent fragmentation and disoriented
resource distribution to marginalized communities. Like the Civil Rights Movement itself, planning
for the full integration of African American communities into the larger economy is a continually
evolving process.
The commemoration of African American culture and struggles for civil rights is a powerful
tool in revitalization and pushes the urban planning discipline to fundamentally challenge sources of
inequity. Commemorative boulevards profoundly shape plans for revitalization, as well as offer an
important frame for how to make equitable decisions in redevelopment. The planning discipline
should not let this go unnoticed.
Many difficult questions remain unanswered in the revitalization of Central City. How to
reach the “turning point,” who benefits from that redevelopment, and how to integrate Central City
into the larger economy and provide sustainable jobs and housing for residents are still open-ended.
To reverse the intentional structural racism of the past will likely take many more decades, but the
ongoing commemorative experiment in Central City shows promise to realize the “just” street and
the “just” community.
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Appendix A

Figure A1. Home Owners Loan Corporation “Residential Security Map,” redlining the
neighborhoods of New Orleans, circa 1930s. Located in the cartographic and architectural holdings
at the National Archives in College Park, MD

Appendix B

Figure B1. Federal Housing Administration “Areas of Major Current Building Activity…in 1940”
are the areas in New Orleans with a small or large star. When compared to the redlining map in
Appendix A, each of the areas of major building activity are located outside of redlined or
“hazardous” areas of the city. Central City is clearly avoided for major investment, as are other
African-American and integrated neighborhoods. Located in the cartographic and architectural
holdings at the National Archives in College Park, MD.
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Appendix C

Figure C1. Commemorative sculptures placed on MLK. The above sculpture is placed at MLK and
O.C. Haley and prompted considerable debate and derision. The below bust of Dr. King was
erected in 1981 and was financed entirely with community donations.
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Appendix D

Figure D1. Ashé Cultural Arts Center fliers for various events.
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Figure D2. Festivals and cultural “gatherings” in Central City
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Appendix E

Figure E1. Murals along MLK on the Brown‟s Dairy property (Author‟s photo)
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Figure E2. Mural by Shakor at MLK and O.C. Haley Boulevards, providing context for the
significance of the abstract sculpture across the street and showing that the artist (Frank Hayden)
was African American (Author‟s photo)

Figure E3. Mural by Shakor at MLK and O.C. Haley Boulevards (Author‟s photo)
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Figure E4. Detail of “Defend the Memory” MLK mural by Shakor, urging nonviolence and peace,
in partnership with Ashe Cultural Arts Center (Author‟s photo)
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Appendix F

Figure F1. National civil rights heritage tour that includes New Orleans
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Appendix G

Figure G1. Petition to locate the Louisiana State Civil Rights Museum on Oretha Castle
Haley Boulevard.
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